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Introduction 
In r~cent years there are increasing numbers of experi-
mental researches vrhere the variables involved in opinion 
change are successfully isolated and independently manipu-
lated in order to assess the net effect of each of the varia~ 
bles. Among those variables, communicator-cred1bility and 
communication-discrepancy were quite extensively examined 
under various experimental conditions, and one could make fair-
ly stable generalizations as.to the role played by each of them 
on opinion change. However, little attempt has been made to 
incorporate these variables into a single experimental design 
in order to assess their separate as well as their combined 
effects. The main interest of the present study, therefore, 
is to vary experimentally the degree of communicator-credibility 
and communication-discrepancy, thereby investigating the main 
and interaction effects of these two variables on opinion 
change: that is, what would happen if these isolated variables 
are put together in one experimental setting, and what would 
be their interaction in this situation.· 
The studies on communicator-credibility in opinion change 
indicate, in general, that the more credible the communication 
source the greater is the opinion change toward the communi-
cation advocated. Thus, Hovland and Weiss (15) found that 
opinion change in the direction advocated by the communication, 
occurred significantly more often when it originated from a 
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high-credible source than vrhen :from a lotrf one, with three o:f 
the :four topics they used. Kelman and Hovland (16), using 
the topic of treatment of juvenile delinquents, also found 
that the group hearing the communication from the positive 
·s·ource changed their opinions . toward the communication more 
than did those hearing it :from the negative source. Hovland 
and Mandell's study (13) showed the same trend with the topic 
of devaluation o:f currency, but the difference between the 
credible and non-credible groups was not statistically sig-
nificant. Fine (4), however, using the topic of biological 
warfare, found almost negligible difference between the credi-
ble and non-credible groups. 
Opinion change is also a function of the discrepancy be-
tween the communicatorrs opinion position and the recipient's 
initial opinion position on a given issue. This discrepancy 
is referred to as the communication-discrepancy in the present 
study. In general, there is a positive relationship between 
such discrepancy and opinion change o:f the recipient. This 
means: the greater the communication-discrepancy the greater 
the opinion change that is produced. Ewing (2) observed this 
phenomenon by using an unknown or ambiguous communicator, and 
the topic of attitude toward Henry Ford. Sims (20) reported 
that, when the co~~unication was favorable to the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the more unfavorable the initial opinion 
the greater the change produced. In these two studies, no 
effort was made to control the possible artifacts, "ceiling" 
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and 11regression 11 effects. However~ the generalizations are 
still valid even after these artifacts are controlled. Thus, 
Goldberg (6), manipulating the communication-discrepancy in-
dependent of the subject's initial position on evaluating 
Negro intelligence from photographs, observed the greater con-
formity to the group norm as the communication-discrepancy in-
creased. Hovland and Pritzker (17) also manipulated experi-
mentally the amount of change in such a way that the amount 
of change could be independent of subjects 1 initial positi'ons, 
and thus confirmed the above generalization. They used au-
thoritative communicator and factual topics such as elec-
tricity produced by atomic power~ compulsory voting in presi-
dential elections, etc. Similar results were reported by 
Fisher and Lubin (5) in their study of a two-person situ~ 
ation requiring judgments of number of paratrooper·g seen in 
briefly exposed photographs, although a tendency of decreas-
ing change with extremely large discrepancy was noted. 
However, the study made by Hovland, Harvey & Sherif (10) 
suggests that when the issue is very important to the sub-
jects, there is a negative relationship between the commu_ni-
cation-discrepancy and opinion change. From the well es~ 
tablished phenomena of the contrast and assimilation effects 
in psychophysics, and from the Sherif, Taub & Hovland study 
(21) using a wei~~t lifting experiment, Hovland, Harvey & 
Sherif (10) argued that if the subjects have established an 
attitude on an issue and the issue· is personally important, 
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their initial opinion positions would function as the anchor-
age, affecting reaction to and evaluation of the communication 
given. They hypothesized that the communication near the sub-
ject;ts initial position would be assimilated to it, while the 
communication which discrepant from the subject's initial po-
sition would be displaced further away (contrast effect). 
Using the topic of prohibition of alcohol in two dry States, 
with a neutral or anonymous communicator, they generally con-
firmed these hypotheses. That is, on the perception of the 
communication, there was a tendency for individuals whose po-
sition was closer to the communicator 1 s position, to report 
his position to be substantially more like their own (assim-
ilation effect); and for those with a more discrepant po-
sition to report the communicator's position as more extreme 
than it really was (contrast effect). On the actual reaction, 
less opinion change was obse~ved when the communication-
discrepancy "\<ras large (a tendency of contrast effect) than 
when the discrepancy was small. It must be noted, however, 
that the subjects who were strongly for or against prohi-
bition might have different characteristics from those of the 
people who are in the middle of the road on the issue. Also, 
mechanisms other than the effect of discrepancy seem to be 
operating when the subjects are exposed to an extremely dis-
crepant communication. Especially when the communicator is 
ambiguous, as in this study, subjects can easily discredit 
the commu_Dicator as unfair or biased, hence resist change. 
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Zimbardo (23) on the other hand, manipulated 11 involve-
ment11 using a comparatively neutral issue and a highly credi-
ble communicator (close friend),~and observed the familiar 
:positive relationship between the communication-discrepancy 
and opinion change. As he indicated in his :paper, the in-
volvement he manipulated was, however, not the 11issue-involve-
mentu a:B. in the above studies, b\lt a 11 response-involvement 11 
where instrumental meaning was attached to the outcome of the 
subject's responses rather than ~o the issue. 
In the :present study the communicator-credibility and 
the communication-discre~ancy between the stand advocated in 
the communication and the stand of the recipient are experi-
mentally varied~ in order to investigate the main as well as 
the interaction effects of these two variables on opinion 
change. 
The credibility of the communicator has at least two at-
tributes: expertness and trustworthiness of the communicator. 
Expertness has been defined as 11 the extent to which a commu-
nicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions," and 
trustworthiness as 11the degree of confidence in the communi-
cator's intent to communicate the assertion he considers 
most valid 11 (11, :p. 21). The communicator-credibility in the 
:present study is manipulated as an independent variable. Also 
an effort was made to differentiate trustworthiness from 
expertness by means of separate ratings on these two attri-
butes by the subjects. 
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Another independent variable, communication-discrepancy, 
was experimentally manipulated by introducing 11 anchor state-
mentsrr at the beginning of the communication. It is assumed 
that this "end anchor'' would affect the subject 1 s judgment of 
the c.ommunicator 1 s position in the direction of being less 
extreme than without this anchor .. , .. From the model of judg-
mental process formulated by Helson (8) that all judgments 
are made with respect to a frame of reference, we can say 
that any judgment including expression of opinion on an issue 
is a function of the relationship between some standard or 
anchor stimulus and the stimuius which would be judged by 
others who had not experienced the standard. For instance, 
when an extremely heavy stimulus is introduced, the other 
stimuli are judged as lighter than when without this stimulus. 
Similar anchor effect was also observed in more complex social 
judgmental process. For example, when Weiss presented sub-
jects with an extreme anchoring statement they judged the com-
municator's position as less extreme than otherwise (22). 
The topic of the present study is based on the issue con-
cerning the causal relationship between cigarette smoking and 
lung cancer. Therefore, it is an issue-involvement according 
to Zimbardo 1 s classification. The degree of importance of the 
topic was not varied experimentally, but checked by means of 
ratings on importance of the topic to the subject, and was 
given close attention in connection with the above two main 
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variables. 
On the basis of the works reviewed above, it is hypothe-
sized with reference to the two main variables, communicator-
credibility and communication-discreuancy, that: 
(1) Greater extent of opinion change toward the commu-
nication advocated is expected when the communicator is high-
credible rather than low-credible. 
(2) Greater extent of opinion change toward the commu-
nication advocated is expected when the communication-dis-
crepancy is large_rather than small. 
(3) When the communicator is high-credible, greater 
extent of opinion change toward t4e communication advocated 
is expected for large-discrepancy groups rather than for 
small-discrepancy groups. 
\then the communicator-credibility is low, the prediction 
can be made in either direction depend~ng upon the particular 
experimental conditions; i.e., the extent of opinion change 
tm.,ard the communicai:,ion advocated may be greater for large-
discrepancy groups than for small discrepancy groups, or vice 
versa. The results of the Hovland, Hai'vey & Sherif study (10) 
appear to indicate that, under conditions when the communi-
cator is ambiguous and the issue is very important to the sub-
ject, the greater the discrepancy the higher the resistance. 
On the other hand, with highly credible communicators as in 
the study by Hovland and Pritzker (14), using issues of low 
importance, the greater the discrepancy the greater the effect. 
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Method 
In order to test the above hypotheses, a before-after 
design involving four experimental and four control groups was 
employed. The overall design of the study was to present com-
munications which were identical except for the two experi-
mental variables: high- and low- credibility of the source of 
the communication, and the large- and small- discrepancy ma-
nipulated by the anchor statements. One half of the experi-· 
mental subjects read a version of the article in which the· 
source is attributed to a high-credible communicator, and the 
other half read a version which was attributed to a low-
credible communicator. Also, for one half of each group, a 
few additional anchor statements, to the effect some people 
hold to the opinion extremes on th$ issue, were inserted in 
the beginning paragraph of the communication. Then the com-
IDUL~icator presented his own opinion which was identical, and 
was read by the other half of the experimental groups. 
Opinion positions on the issue discussed in the commu-
nication were measured before the communication and again 
after the communication. In addition to these opinion po-
sitions, ratings on a series of judgmental items were in-
cluded in order to obtain measures on the experimental vari-
ables, and other relevant information. 
The issue referred to the causal relationship between 
cigarette smoking·and lung cancer. 
The control group, which corresponded to the above 
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mentioned experimental groups in every respect except the 
communication effect, gave their opinions before reading the 
communication, and then made the same judgments of the com-
munication as did the experimental subjects •. Thus, eight 
different treatments were required •. 
Sub,jects 
The subjects who were exposed to both sessions were 216 
undergraduates from Boston University (98 Freshmen, 34 Sopho-
mores, 57 Juniors, and 27 Seniors), i'rho came from the four 
different schools: School of Fine and Applied Arts (N=l02), 
Schopl of Public Relations and Communication (N=65), College 
of Liberal Arts (N:29), and College of Business Adminis-
tration (N:20).' The subjects from each school were proportion-
ally assigned to the experimental (N:l49) and control (N:67) 
groups by approximately a 2 to 1 ratio.' 
Procedure 
1. Before-Session: The questionnaire booklet (Appendix 
B) was presented to the subjects in a group as an opinion 
survey on current social issues, sponsored by the Human 
Relations Center of Boston University. It was administered 
by a staff member of the Center who was assisted by the in-
structor of the class concerned and by another member of the 
Center. 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts: subject's 
own opinion, importance of the topic to the subject, and the 
credibility of the source as a communicator of the topic. 
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In the first part of the questionnaire the subjects 
were asked to indicate their opinion on the statement "Ciga..., 
rette smoking is one of the causes of lung- cancer. 11 This -
measure was taken as the subject's initial opinion position 
on the topic. There were six filler statements which were on 
the problems of radioactivity fallout, capital punishment, 
Communist China, juvenile delinquency, and communism vs. capi-
talism. Each statement was rated on an eleven-point graphic 
scale which ranged from 0 (compl~te disagreement) through 5 
(uncertain or in doubt) to 10 (complete agreement). In this 
part the subjects were also asked to rate the statement 
11People who smoke cigarettes are more ·likely to have lung 
cancer later in life than· are people who do not smoke. tr As 
the communication concentrates its arguments exclusively on 
the causal relationship this measure was.not taken as their 
initial opinion position in the following analysis. 
In the second part of the questionnaire the subjects 
rated the importance to themselves of the topic on cigarette 
smoking and lung cancer, along with five other filler topics 
mentioned above. The scale had eleven points, from unot im-
portant at all to me1i (0 )J thr~:mgh umoderately important to 
me 11 (50), to "extremely important to mett (100). 
In the third part of the questionnaire the subjects 
rated each of the six names, persons, or organizations in 
terms of their expertness and trustworthiness as a source of 
information on the topic of cigarette smoking·and lung cancer. 
ll 
The scale for expertness, which was defined for the 
subjects as uthe amount of knowledge the·communication source 
has on the topic concerned, 11 had five points on a descriptive 
rather than a graphic scale. The descriptions of likelihood 
of knowledge ranged from almost nothing about the topic, only 
a few facts, some of the facts, most of the facts, and all the 
facts. The trustworthiness of a source referred to its being 
a fair·and unbiased communicator of the facts, and the scale 
ranged from 11not trust~torthy at all 11 ( 0), through 11moderately 
trustworthy" (50), to 11 extremely trustworthy" (100). 
The communication sources rated for the present topic 
were: "your parent," "American Tobacco Company," "Director of 
the Tobacco Industry Public Relations Committee," "Head of the 
National Cancer Institute, 11 11 Internal Revenue Service, U.S. 
Treasury Dept., 11 and "Public Health Service." The similar 
ratings on communication sources were requested for each of 
the other three filler topics: communism vs. capitalism, radio-
activity fallout, and juvenile delinquency. 
Subject~:s name, age, sex, major, and class were asked 
for at the end of the questionnaire on a separate sheet. 
The data of the before-session were gathered between 
Nov. 9, and Nov. 23, 1959. 
2. After-Session: In this session the subjects.were 
as{:l.Jtgned randomly to either experimental or control groups 
by approximately a 2 to 1 ratio. That is, the number of the 
experimental group was twice that of the control group.~ 
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The experimental group was divided randomly int.o four 
sub-groups according to the two main experiment~l variables, 
communicator-credibility and·· communication-discrepancy: High-
Credibility with Large-Discrepancy (HC-LD), High-Credibility 
with Small-Discrepancy (HC-SD), Low-Credibiiity with Large-
Discrepancy (LC-LD) , and Low-Cl"edipility itfith Small-Discrepancy 
(LC-SD). They were given the communication which advocates 
the idea that there is no causal relationship between ciga-
rette smoking and lung cancer. The effect of communication 
was assessed immediately after these experimental subjects 
were exposed to the communication, by asking them to indicate 
their opinion positions on the same statement used at the 
before-session. 
The four control groups·which correspond to the four 
experimental groups indicated their opinion positions on the 
same statement without being exposed to the communication. 
For the control groups, it was also worthwhile to have all the 
measures taken for the experimental group other than that of 
. . 
communication effect, in order to obtain a sound base line 
for assessing the opinion change. Moreover, it was desirable 
to make the time required for the task approximately the same 
f.or the experimental and qontrol groups since both groups 
responded in the same class room. Therefore, the control 
groups were requested to read the same communication after 
they indicated their opinion position on the statement. They 
also responded to the items about: the communicator and com-
13 
munication, their smoking habits, and the fact-quiz items, as 
the experimental group did. By this procedure, the control 
groups could be compared with experimental groups in every 
respect except that of the communication effect. The communi-
cation had no effect on opinion change for the control group 
since they gave their opinions pefore they read the communi-
cation. 
Thus, ·there were altogether eight different treatments.' 
The questionnaire booklets (Appendix C) covering the above 
eight treatments, were arranged in a random order using a 
table of random numbers with the ratio mentioned above; and 
were handed out to the subjects in this prearranged order.' 
The after-session was held two to four weeks after the 
before-session, i.e., between Dec. 11 and Dec. 16, 1959. An 
effort was made to prevent the subjects from associating this 
session with the before-session. The subjects were told that 
this was a study by the Department of Psychology of Boston 
University, and was to investigate ho1v people evaluate opinions 
of others, ho-.,.r they recall some of the :points made in the com-
munication, etc. This session was administered by different 
persons from the before-session vdth exception of the in-
structor of the class. 
To prevent the control group from looking over the com-
munication before they gave. their opinions, and to obtain ac-
curate recall scores tor both experimental and control groups, 
the following special instruction was added to the general 
instruction. 
"When we hand out the booklets, take one from the top, 
and pass the rest to the next person, and do not open it until 
you are told to do so. 
As you go along to rate the scale or answer the questions, 
please do not go back to the earlier part of the questionnaire 
although you might change your mind or do not recall some of 
the facts. 
The reason we want you to follow·these two rules is to 
insure.the randomness of the response, that is, each booklet 
contains essentially .the same content but with different 
orders of questions, and those booklets are in turn arranged 
in random order. 
So, please follow the instruction carefully." 
For the experimental group the after-measurement-s were 
given immediately after the subjects read the communication.' 
The conditions of the control group were exactly the same ex-
cept that they gave their opinions on cigarette smoking and 
lung cancer, and indicated the importance of the topic, before 
the communication. 
• The measUrements covered in this session were those of: 
communicator's position, trustworthiness of the communicator, 
fairness of the article, subjectst own opinion position, im-
portance of the topic, recall of the content, and smoking habit. 
The first part of the after-measures included the items 
on the evlauation of the communicator'sposition, trustworthi-
ness of the communicator, and the fairness of the article. 
The subject-s' judgments of the communic~tor's position 
~trere obtained by the ratings made on the statement : ttCiga-
rette smoking is one of the causes of lung cancer. 11 The 
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eleven-point graphic scale vras used with values ranging from 
''complete rejection11 (0), through "uncertain or in doubt 11 (5) 
to "complete acceptance 11 (10) of the above statement. The 
subjects were also asked to judge the communicator's position 
on the statement: 110igarette smoking is statistically associ-
ated with lung cancer. 11 This was not, however, taken for the 
measure of discrepancy because the communication advocated the 
idea that there is no causal relationship between cigarette 
smoking and lung cancer. 
The measure of the communicator's trustworthiness was the 
same as in the before-measures except that the range of the 
scale was 0 to 10 instead of 0 to 100 used in the before-
measure. The fairness of the.article was obtained from the 
subjects' ratings in terms of how they thought about the arti-
cle, that is, as fair or one-sided. The scale ranged from 
11 completely one-sidedtt (0 ), through 11moderately fair 11 (5 )., to 
ttcompletely fair" (10). 
The second part of the after-measure was concerned with 
the subjects' own opinion position and with the importance of 
the topic to them. To obtain the subject's own opinion score, 
the same opinion statement which was used in the before-measure 
( 11 0igarette smoking is one of the causes of lung cancer 11 ) was 
given again, and the subjects were asked to indicate their 
positions on the same eleven-point scale. Subjects also gave 
their opinions on the statement= "People who smoke cigarettes 
are more likely to have lung cancer later in life than are 
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people who do not smol{e. 11 This measure was not taken for 
the main analysis, however, for the reason presented above. 
The degree of importance of the topic to the subjects was 
also rated on the eleven-point scale as in the before-measure 
(0 to 10 instead of 0 to lOO). 
In part three, five multiple-choice fact-quiz items 
based on the content of the communication were given to de-
termine their recall score, or learning. In part four the 
information about smoking habits was obtained by asking 
whether they smoked, did not smoke, smoked before but stopped, 
end inquiring about the number of cigarettes they smoke or 
smoked in a day. Personal data such as subject's name, major, 
year were asked on a separate sheet at the end. 
Variables 
1. Communication: The communication (Appendix C) was 
prepared by the writer utilizing various publications on the 
problem of smoking and lung cancer. The main idea emphasized 
was that there is no causal relationship between cigarette 
smoking and lung cancer. More specifically, it was admitted 
in the beginning of the article that there is some evidence 
from the statistical correlations, which admits a link be-
tween smoking and lung cancer. It was argued, however, that 
the statistic~l correlation is not proof of a causal relation-
ship, and that the factual and experimental evidences are all 
against the notion of causal relationship. After introducing 
a number of examples of experimental and observational data 
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in support of' the argument the writer concluded that there are 
significantly more sound experimental results which would cauae 
one to reject rather than to accept the notion that smoking is 
a cause of lung cancer. This position of the communication 
was advisable also because an examination of' the initial 
position taken by the subjects in the before-measures indi-
cated that they held ideas which were predominantly in the 
direction of' agreement with the statement that there is a 
causal relatio:h"ship between smoking and lung cancer. 
2. Communicator-Credibility: The results of' the before-
measures showed that 11Head of the National Cancer !nsti tute, u 
and 11Public Health Service" were rated as very high in trust-
worthiness (means: 86.40 and 83.42, respeotively). On the 
other hand, "American Tobacco Company, tt and "Director of' To-
bacco Industry Public Relations Committee" were rated con-
siderably lower in the trustworthiness (means: 29.83 and 39.22, 
respectively)~ In rating the communicator's e~pertness, these 
four sources were in the category of. "the source likely to 
know most? of the facts". Therefore, it was decided to use 
11Dr. W. C. Hueper, Head of the Environmental Cancer Section 
of the National Cancer Institute~ Public Health Servioe 11 as 
.. . . -. 
high-credible communicator, and "Mr. J~. P. Richards, Director 
of the Tobacco Industry Public Relations Committee which in-
cludes American Tobacco Co., R. J. Reyholds, Liggett & Meyers, 
Brown Williamson11 as the low-credible source. At the beginning 
of the communication it was indicated that the article was 
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delivered as a speech by the author specified. The author's 
name and title were repeated at the top of each of the six 
pages of the communication. 
3. Communication-Discrepancy: J!.IcGarvey (17) demonstrated 
the effect of anchor stimuli on complex judgmental :phenomena, 
taking t~e suggestion from psychophysical experimentation. 
Weiss (22), in his recent study, also demonstrated that the 
communication of :punitive :policy toward delinquents is judged 
less :punitive with the addition of a few introductory state-
ments to the effect that some :people hold to the opinion ex-
tremes of complete leniency or excessive :punitiveness tovrard 
delinquency more than. without these statements. One of the 
present experimental groups was given an end anchor statements 
in the expectation that it would effect the subjects to judge 
the communication as less extreme than they would without 
this anchor. Accordingly, the group with this anchor would 
be, on the whole, less discrepant from the communicator's po-
sition than the group 1dthout these statements. The group 
with the anchor was, therefore, called as 11 small-discrepancyu 
group, and the group without this anchor was called as rtlarge-
discrepancylf group. 
The anchor statements were given as: 
11
.Some hold the extreme belief that cigarette smoking is 
unquestionaply a cause of lung cancer and that if you smoke 
cigarettes:. you will eventually have lung c~cer. Others hold 
to the extreme opposite belief that cigarette smoking bears 
no relationshiP whether or not a :person vlill have lung cancer. tf 
This was inserted as a part of the speech at the beginning of 
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the article. 
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Results 
The results are presented in three sections: (1) the 
effectiveness of the main experimental variables; (2) the 
effect of main variables on opinion change; and (3) the effect 
of other related variables on opinion ch~nge. 
The Effectiveness of the Main Experimental Variables 
1. Communicator-Credibility: Dr. W. C. Hueper of the 
National Cancer Institute, who was chosen as a high-credible 
communicator, was x·ated by the subjects as more trustworthy 
than the low-credible communicator, Mr. J. P. Richards of the 
Tobacco Industry Public Relations Committee, on the topic of 
cigarette smoking and lLmg cancer. The mean ratings for the 
high- and low- credible communicators are 7.94 and 5.10, re-
spectively, and this difference is significant (pc:;::_. 00051 ). 
If the. overall median ratings on trustworthiness by the entire 
experimental group are taken as a reference, 81 per cent of 
the,high-credible group judged Dr. Hueper above the median, 
while only 35 per cent of the low-credible group judged Mr. 
Richards above this median. 
In support of the above results, the article attributed 
to Dr. Hueper was judged as more fair than was the one at-
tributro to Mr. Richards, although the same communication 1vas 
given to the two groups. The mean ratings on the fairness of 
1. In the following analyses, all p values are tested 
by t, and one-tailed, unless otherwise specified. 
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the article by high-credible and low-credible groups are 7.15 
and 4.41, respectively, and this difference is significant 
(p .<:.. 0005). 
Therefore, it is justified to use the groups which read 
the communication supposedly delivered by Dr. Hueper of the 
National Cancer Institute as the High-Credible group, and 
those who received the communication from Mr. Richards of the 
Tobacco Industry Public Relations Committee as the Low-Credible 
group. 
It is noted that mean ratings on trustworthiness for Mr. 
Richards with his t'itle (5.10) is higher than that of the low-
credible so~~ces rated in the before-measures (means2 : 2.85 for 
American Tobacco Company, and 3.99 for Director of Tobacco 
Industry Public Relations Committee). On the other hand, a 
slightly lower mean rating for Dr. Hueper (7.94) with the given 
title than results from the two high-credible sources rated at 
the before-session (means3: 8.21 for Head of the National Cancer 
Institute and 8.67 for the Public Health Service) is observed. 
Although the mean ratings on trustworthiness of the commu-
nicator at the after-session are not directly comparable 
with those of the before-sessions, because of the addition 
of the name of a specific person, and of changes or additions 
2, 3. Before-session means are converted into 0 - 10 
point scale from 0 - 100 for easy comparisons. Both scales 
have 11 points where no in-between judgment within a point 
is permitted. 
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in the wording of the organizations which they represent, the 
above phenomena may be due to the regression effect: i.e., 
both high and low trustworthiness showed a tendency to regress 
toward the mean in the after-measures. This regression effect, 
however, cannot be estimated since no adequate base line was 
available. Consequently, the effect of communication on the 
ratings on trustworthiness is diffi.cult to assess. 
2. Communication-Discre-pancy: Commuhication-discre:pancy 
was manipulated by the intr.oduction of "anchor statements tt as 
mentioned before. Contrary to the expectation, the rating 
of the communicatorts position made by the group with anchor 
statements was not proved to be less extreme than the ratings 
given by the group without this anchor (means: 3.06 and 3.43, 
respectively.) Accordingly no difference between these two 
groups in their subsequent opinion change was expected. The 
mean change score for the group with anchor statements was 
1.27 and that of the group ·without this anchor was 1.29. Con-
sequently, this discrepancy variable related to the anchor 
statements was not used. 
Instead~ the communication-discrepancy of the present 
study was derived from the subjects' ratings on the communi-
cator's position. The subjects were divided into two groups 
according to the median of all their judgments on the commu-
nicator's position (3.18). All the subje.cts' ratings of their 
own initial opinion position yielded a mean of 7.13. The 
below-median groups' judgments of communicator's position 
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yielded a mean of l. 54, whereas the .. above-median group 
~ielded a mean of 5. 22. The below-median group was mol"e 
discrepant (7.l0 - 1.54, or 5.56 points on the scale), than 
was the above-median group (7.16- 5.22, or 1.94 points), 
from their own mean initial positions. The difference be-
tween these two mean discrepancies for the below- and above-
median groups (5.56 '"" 1.94, or 3.62 points on the .scale) is 
statistically significant (p<:.Ol). Therefore, the former, 
or below-median group, is called the Large-Discrepancy group, 
and the latter, or above-median group, is called the Small-
Discrepancy group. 
In order to justify the use of this derived communication-
discrepancy as a proper variable for further analysis, however, 
the following consideratioDE have to be made. If there is 
· .. ,\_•. 
a significant positive correlation between the subjects' 
initial positions and their judged communicator's position, 
one cannot use the difference between the two positions as 
the discrepancy variable, because it is confounded with the 
subject's initial position. On the other hand, if we find a 
negative correlation, as we could properly expect from the 
experimental evidence of 11 contrastu and 11assimilation 11 effects 
in perceiving communication (l~), .the ceiling and regression 
effects would remain in the situation~ That is, the negative 
correlation means that the individuals whose position is less 
discrepant from that of the communicator tend to judge the 
commu_nicator's position as less extreme, while those with more 
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discrepant position tend to judge communicator•s position 
as more extreme than it really is. Under these circumstances, 
a large discrepancy g~oup is likely to regress toward the 
mean score of the pop~lation at the after-session without any 
communicaiti,ion effect resulting in sp}lrious increase in the 
extent of opinion change toward the idea of the communication. 
On the other hand, a ~m~ll-4iscrepancy group may regress to-
ward the mean at the after-session. ·counteracting the positive 
opinion change. This regression effect, together with the 
smaller initial distance to move (ceiling effect), would 
spuriously minimize the opinion change for this group. 
To check these possible artifacts, the correlation be-
tween the subjects' initial opinion position and the commu-
nicator's position judged b~ the subjects was computed, and 
. 2 found to be negligible (re .04, X = .oo). Furthermore, the 
mean initial positions of the small- and large- discrepancy 
groups are almost the same (7.10 and 7.16, respectively). Ac-
cordingly, the artifacts_, which could arise if we take simply 
the above- and below- median groups on the·basis- of their 
initial position as a discrepancymeasure, are well under 
control in the derivation of this discrepancy variable. Ac-
cordingly, this derived communication-discrepancy -variable, 
based upon the judgment of the communicator's position by the 
subjects, is used in the following analysis in place of the 
original variable with the anchor statements. 
A few words on the use of the control group is in order.1 
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As noted before, there were four control groups which cor-
responded to the four experimental groups. The control groups 
received exactly the same treatment as the experimental groups, 
except that the former groups gave their opinions before they 
read the communication. This procedur~ was to insure com-
parability between experimental and control groups in every 
possible respect measured except the communication effect. 
When one of the variables, the communication-discrepancy 
used in the present analysis, is not experimentally manipulated 
but derived from the subjects' judgments on the communicator's 
position:~_/ afte_r the experiment, comparability between. ~xper:l:­
mental and control groups is the especially important pre-
sumption. If there are no significant differences between 
the experimental and the control groups in every possible re-
spect measured, one is in the strong position to justify the 
use of the derived d~screpancy variable. In order to check 
comparability, the control groups were compared with the ex-
perimental groups with respect to the subjects' (1) initial 
opinion position; (2) ratings on the importance of the topic, 
(3) judgment of communicator's position, ( 4-) ratings on the 
trustworthiness of the communicator, (5) ratings on fairness 
of the article, and (6) recall scores (See Table 11 in Ap-
pendix A). No single significant difference was found be-
tween the tv10 groups for the six comparisons made • 
In the assessment of opinion change all control groups 
are combined, and this combined control group serves as the 
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base line for comparison with the experimental groups. This 
procedure is based on the assumption that control groups are 
homogeneous among themselves, for no significant differences 
among the control sub-groups were found in the measures ob-
tained in this study. ·Direct one-to-one sub-group compari-
sons between experimental and control groups, however, were 
made whenever necessary. 
Communication Effect as a Function of Commu_nicator-Credibility 
and Communication-Discreuancy 
Communication effect is assessed by the chan~e score. 
The change score is the difference between the before- and 
after- measures in the opinion scores obtained by the rating 
scale. Positive change score indicates the movement toward 
the communicator•s position, i.e., toward the position that 
there is no causal relationship between cigarette smoking and 
lung cro1cer. Negative change signifies the movement away 
from the position advocated by the communicator. 
The mean opinion changes for the experimental groups and 
for the contro14 group are presented in Table 1; and the ana-
lysis of variance applied to the 2x2 table of two main vari-
ables, commUl1icator-credibility and communication-discrepancy, 
is presented in Table 2. As noted before, there was no sig-
nificant difference between the experimental and control groups 
4. In the follOI'Iing pages, the control group refers to 
the combined control group ,as a whole, unless otherwise speci-
fied. 
N 
Mean 
SD 
Diff. 
Table 1 
Mean Opinion Che~ge for Each Experimental 
Sub-Group and the Control Group 
High-Credibility Low-Credibility 
Control Large- Small- Large- Small-
Group Discrep. Discrep. Discrep. Discrep. 
67 38 40 42 29 
0.28 2.16** 1.13 1.21 0.45 
2.73 2.31 1.95 3.09 2.39 
1.03 0.76 
** Significant at .01 level. 
Source 
Table 2 
Analysis of Variance of Change Scores for 
Experimental Groups with Credibility 
and Discrepancy as the Variables 
s.s. df m. s. F p 
Credibility (c) 19~63 1 19.63 3.14 .lO>p>.05 
Discrepancy (D) 25.02 1 25.02 4.00 -<.05 
Interaction: CxD 5.85 1 5.85 
Within 207:.66 ~ 6.25 Total 958.16 1 
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in their initial opinion positions (means: 7.13 and 7.04, 
respectively). 
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The group which was exposed to the communication (ex-
perimental group as a whole) shows significantly greater ex-
tent of opinion change toward the communication advocated than 
does the group which was not exposed to it (control group) 
(p< .Ol). 
The difference between the High- and Low- Credibility 
groups within the experimental group is significant by t test 
(p<. 05). The group who received the commu..llication which at-
tributed to the High-Credible source (Dr. Hueper of the Cancer 
Institute~ Public Health Service) chruLged more toward the com-
munication advocated, than did the group which read the com-
munication from Low-Credible source (~r. Richards of Tobacco 
Industry Public Relations Committee). Also, the difference 
between the Large- and Small- Discrepancy groups is signifi-
cant by t test (p< .·0~5). Thus, those who judged the commu-
nicator's position as more discrepant from their own stand, 
changed more toward the communication th~ll did those who 
judged it as less discrepant. The interaction effect between 
these two main variables, communicator-credibility and commu-
nication-discrepancy, is not significant. That is, within 
high- and low- credible groups, both large-discrepancy groups 
changed more toward the communication advocated than did the 
small-discrepancy groups. 
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When the experimental group~ are compared with the con-
trol group, it is noted that overall High-Credible group shows 
significantly greater extent of opinion change toward the com-
munication than the control group (p~.0005). Similarly, only 
the overall Large-Discrepancy group ha·s significantly higher 
mean change score toward.the communication than does the 
control group (p~.005). Both overall Low-Credible and over-
all Small-Discrepancy groups have higher mean change scores 
than doea the control group, but these differences are not 
quite signi:ficant ( .lO>p ::>.05 for both groups). 
Second order comparisons show no significant interaction. 
Although all four sub-groups show greater mean opinion changes 
than the control group shows, only the HO-LD group is signi-
ficantly changed more toward the communication. 
When each of the sub-group means within the experimental 
group (means: 1.63 for HO-and 0.90 for LO- group) is compared 
with that of its own corresponding control group, the same 
conclusion can be derived, since the sub-group means within 
the control group are not significantly different from each 
other (means: 0.39 fo.r HO- and 0.18 for LO- group). Similar 
comparisons between experimental LD- and control LD- group 
(means: 1.66 and 0.51, respectively), and between experimental 
SD-and control SD- group (means: 0.84 and 0.00) were made, 
and showed the same trend as the above, except the fact that 
the difference in the latter comparison became significant 
(p~.05). The difference between two sub-group means within 
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the control group is, however, not significant. 
The data were also analyzed by the net uroportion of' 
changeS, and the results are presented in Table 12, Appendix· 
A. On the whole, the same .conclusions were derived as from 
the change score presented above, although some changes in 
the significant level of' differences were observed. 
The communication effect was also assessed by another· 
discrepancy measure, the distance between subject's initial 
position and the communicator • s position as judged by the sub-
ject. Both High- and Low- Credibility groups were divided 
into two groups (by median dichotomization, median, 4.06) ac-
cording to this discrepancy score. The above-median group is 
called Large-Discrepancy group, and the below-median group as 
Small-Discrepancy group. Table 13 in Appendix A summarizes 
these results. The analysis of variance made on these two main 
variables is presented in Table 14 in Appendix A. 
One can draw essentially the same conclusions derived 
above, except that the difference,; between Large- and Small-
Discrepancy groups in opinion change became much more signi-
ficant (p~.0005). It is noted, however, this change comes 
in part from the fact that discrepancy is confounded with the 
5. The net proportion of change is defined by Hovland, 
Lumsdaine & Sheffield (12), as the difference between pro-
portion of' positive change and proportion of negative change. 
Positive ch..ange in the present analysis is the movement to-
ward the communicator's position advocated, and the negative 
change sieJlifies the movement away from it. 
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subject's initial position. It is shown that majority o~ 
the Large-Discrepancy group come from the above-median group 
on their initial position, while those whose initial positions 
are below the median form the Small-Discrepancy group. Thus, 
the relationship between the subject's initial position and 
this discrepancy measure is found to be significant (X2=48.56, 
df-i<51, p<. 01). 
Communication Effect Related to Other Variables 
The importance of the topic, smoking habits, fairness of 
the article, and the learning from the communication, which 
were included in the after measures, may have had some effects 
in producing opinion change, and these effects are examined in 
the following section. 
1. Importance of the Topic: The experimental group was 
dichotomized according ~o the median6 of the ratings on the 
importance of the topic (median, 7.05). The above- and below-
median groups are called High-Importance and Low-Importance 
groups, respectively. The initial opinion positions of these 
two groups were not significantly different from each other 
6. This is the median of after measures on importance 
of the topic. Since there are little change in the ratings 
·on the importa_11.ce of the topic .from before- to after- commu-
nication (means: 6.11 and 6.23, respectively) which measure 
is used for dichotomization did not make any difference in as-
sessing the opinion change. ·Also, the control group rated the 
importance of the topic before they were exposed to the commu-
nication. The after-mean of the experimental group can be 
compared with the control m:ean (6.43) and showed this difference 
to be negligible. 
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(means! 7.16 for High-Importance, and 7.05 for Low-Importance 
groups, respectively). 
The mean opinion change for High- and Low- Importru~ce 
groups of both experimental and control groups are shown in 
Table 3, and the analysis of variance o~ change scores for 
High- vs. Low- Importance and Experimental vs. Control groups 
is presented in Table 4. 
It is found that the Low-Importance group changed signifi-
cantly more toward the communication advocated, than did the 
High-Importance group (p<:.Ol). It is also noted that only 
the Low-Importance group has significantly higher mean change 
score than its corresponding control Low-Importance group 
(p<.05). 
2. Smoking Habits: The subjects were divided into 
three categories according to their smoking habits: the Non-
Smokers (including 12 people who smoked before but stopped), 
the Light-Smokers who smoke less than 15 cigarettes in a day, 
and the Heavy-Smokers who smoke 15 or more cigarettes per day. 
The mean opinion change of Non-, Light-, and Heavy-
Smokers in both experimental and control groups, are presented 
in Table 5. Table 6 shows the analysis of variance of change 
scores for groups with different smoking habits and for Ex-
perimental vs. Control groups. 
There are no significant differences among these three 
groups in their opinion changes. When each sub-group mean 
within the experimental group is compared with its corresponding 
Table 3 
Mean Opinion Change for High-
and Lmv- Importance Groups 
Experimental Group Control Group 
High- Low- High- Low-
Importance Importance Importance Importance 
N 
Mean 
SD 
Diff. 
74 
0.80 
2.62 
75 
1.76* 
2.35 
34 
-0.03 
2.69 
0.64 
33 
0.61 
2.73 
* Significant at .05 level. 
** Significant at .01 level.-
Source 
Table•4 
Analysis of Variance of Change Scores for 
High- vs. Low- Lmportru1ce and for 
Experimental vs. Control Groups 
s.s. df m. s. F p 
Importance (I) 40.91 1 40.91 6.13 <.01 
Exp. vs. Control (EC) 46.06 1 46.06 6.91 -<:.01 
Interaction: I ,x EC .. 0.59 1 0.59 
Vfithin ll4-14. 27 212 6.67 
Total 1,501.83 215 
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N 
Mean 
SD 
Diff. 
Table 5 
Mean Opinion Change for Non-
Light-, and Heavy- Smokers 
Experimental Group 
Non-Smokers Light-Smokers Heavy-Smokers 
65· 
1.43** 
2.42 
33 
1.58* 
2.39 
0.84 
Diff. Non -Heavy 
0.15 
0.69 
N 
Mean 
SD 
Diff. 
Diff. 
Control Group 
Non-Smokers Light-Smokers Heavy-Smokers 
32 17 
-0.19 0.65 
2.79 2.37 
0.84 
Non - Heavy 0.79 
* Significant at .05 level. 
** Significant at .01 level. 
15 
0.60 
3.01 
0.05 
Total N does not correspond to 216 due to 7 subjects 1 
failure to respond to this question. 
Source 
Table 6 
Analysis of Variance of Ch~~ge Scores for 
Groups with Different Smoking Habits, and 
for Experimental vs. Control Groups 
s.s. df m. s. F 
Smoking Habits (S) 9.42 2 4.71 
(EC) . 47.29 47.29 Exp. vs. Control 1 6.89 
Interaction: S x EO 17.92 2 8.96 1.31 
\vi thin lz323.22 __gQ2 6.86 
Total 1,467.92 208 
35 
p 
~.01 
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control sub-group mean, however, Non- and Light- Smokers 
show significantly higher mean change scores toward the com-
munication than did the control groups (p<.Ol, p..c::..05, re-
spectively); while Heavy-Smokers do not differ from the control 
group significantly. 
There were significant differences in their initial 
opinion positions among these three groups (p~.05 by F). In-
dividual i test shows that, Non- and Light- Smokers do not dif-
fer in their initial positions (means: 7.66 and 7.24, respective-
ly). Heavy-Smokers, however, (mean, 6.19) are significantly 
.. 
lower than Non-Smokers in their initial position (p~.05), and 
are also considerably but not significantly lower than Light-
Smokers ( .lO:>p;>.05). 
No significant relationship between subjects• smoking 
habits and the judgment of communicator's position is found 
(X2:o.88). There is a considerable degree of positive re-
lationship between the smoking habits and the subject's judg-
ment on importt:1nce of the topic (X2:18.30, df:2, p4.C>1; 0~:0.35)! 
i.e., Heavy-Smokers judged the topic as more important while 
the Non- and Light- Smokers judged it as less important to 
them. 
3. Fairness of the Communication: All groups were di-
chotomized by the median rating of the fairness judged by the 
subjects (median, 5.74); and the mean opinion changes for 
High- and Low- Fairness groups in both experimental and control 
groups are shown in Table 7. Table 8 presents the analysis of 
Table 7 
Mean Opinion Change for High-
and Low- Fairness Groups 
Experimental Group Control Group 
High- Low- High- Low-
Fairness Furness Fairness Fairness 
N 77 72 33 34 
Mean 1.69~' 0.85 0.36 0.21 
SD 2.6~ 2.37 2.12 3.20 
Diff. 0.84* 0.15 
* Significant at .05 level. 
** Significant at .01 level. 
Source 
Fairness 
Table 8 
Analysis of Variance of Change Scores 
for High- vs. Low- Fairness and for 
Experimental vs. Control Groups 
s.s. df m. s. F 
(F) '22.76 1 22.76 3.38 
p 
Exp. vs. Control (EC) 46.06 1 46.06 6.83 <=.01 
Interaction: F x EO .. 3-97 1 3·97 
Within 1 2422.04 212 6.74 
Total 1,501.83 215 
37 
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variance of change scores for High- vs. Low- Fairness groups 
and Experimental-vs. Control groups. 
It is shown that the High-Fairness group changed signifi-
cantly more toward the communication than did Low-Fairness 
group (p<:.05). Thus, when the High- and Low- Fairness groups 
within the experimental group are compared with their cor-
responding control sub-groups, only the High-Fairness group 
shows significantly greater mean change than that of the control 
group·. 
As the correlation between the credibility and the fair-
ness judged by the subjects is high (x2 =25.97, df-1, p~.Ol; 
C• .39) the above result could be regarded as a confounding. 
In order to partial ·out the credibility effect in the present 
comparison, the median of the High-Credibility and ·Low-Credi-
bility groups were calculated separately (7.94 and 4.13, res-
pectively), and the subjects in each of the High- and Low-
Credibility groups were divided into two sub-groups according 
to their own medians. Within the High-Credible group no sig-
nificant difference between the above- and below- median groups 
was found in their opinion change (means: 1.55 and 1.74, res-
pectively). Within the Low-Credibl·e group, the above-median 
group shows more opinion change than the below-median group 
(means: 1.42 and 0.50, respectively), but this difference 
also does not quite reach statistical significance ( .10> p >. 05). 
Therefore, the conclusion derived above does not hold after 
the credibility effect is eliminated. 
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4. Learning of the Content of the Communication: The 
learning score is obtained from the five multiple-choice items 
in the after-,questionnaire. The median score of the entire 
group is 3.54 (theoretical range:·O- 5). Table 9 summarizes 
the mean opinion change for High- and Low- Learning groups in 
both the experimental and control groups. The analysis of 
variance of the change scores for High- vs. Low- Learning groupsf? 
and for Experimental vs. Control groups is presented in Table 
10. 
'It is fou_nd that there is no significant difference be-
tween High- and Low- .Learning groups in their opinion ch~nge: 
that is, both groups changed significantly more toward the 
communication t~~n did their corresponding control sub-groups 
( p~. 01 for both comparisons). 
There was no significant difference between High- and 
Low- Learning groups in their initial opinion positions (means: 
7-37 and 6.82, respectively). 
N 
Mean 
SD 
Diff. 
Table 9 
Mean Opinion Change for High-
and Low- Learning Groups 
Experimental Group Control Group 
High-
Learning 
75 
1.31~(. 
2.18 
0.05 
Loy.r-
Learning 
74 
1.26* 
2.85 
High-
Learning 
37 
0.27 
3.20 
0.03 
Low-
Learning 
30 
0.30 
2.31 
Significant at .05 level. 
Source 
Learning 
Ex:p. vs. 
(L) 
Table 10 
Analysis of Variance of Change Scores 
for. High- vs. Low- Learning and for 
Experimental vs. Control Groups 
s.s. df m. s. F 
0.01 l 0.01 
Control (EC) 46.06 l 46.06 6.70 
Interaction: L x EC 0.09 l 0.09 
Within 11452-67 212 6.87 
Total 1,501.83 215 
p 
<.05 
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Discussion 
The present results support the hypotheses .predicted 
concerning the effects of communicator-credibility and commu-
nication-discrepancy on opinion change. That is, the opinion 
change toward the communication is facilitated as the cred-
ibility and the discrepancy increased. Since these hypothe-
ses W?re derived from a review of the previous '"'orks where 
these. variables were more or less separately treated, rather 
than from the existing theories, the confirmation also means 
that the present data are consistent with the results re-
ported by others. The lack of interaction effect between the 
variables in this study is the main reason for this agreement. 
The opinion change obtained is, therefore, a simple additive 
function of the two variables. 
Communicator-Credibility 
The main attribute of the communicator-credibility which 
.differentiates between the high- and low- credibility groups 
in the present study, was trustworthiness rather than expert-
ness. In the before-session the trustworthiness and expert-
. i 
ness of the communication sources on the.topic of smoking and 
lung cancer were rated separately. The median ratings on 
expertness of the two low-credible sources (American Tobacco 
Company and_Tobacco Industry Public Relations Committee) and 
those of the two high-credible sources (Head of the National 
Cancer Institute and Public Health Service) were all found to 
be in the same descriptive rating category of 11 the source that 
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knows most of the facts on the topic tr; i>rhereas the median 
ratings on trustworthiness of the former two and of the latter 
two, were significantly different in favor of the latter. 
In the after-session Dr. Hueper of the National Cancer 
Institute was rated as significantly more trustworthy than 
Mr. Richards of the Tobacco Industry Public Relations Committee. 
The expertness of these two sources was, however, not rated 
in this session. It is possible that the expertness ratings 
between the before- and after- sessions would not be the same. 
It is also unlikely, however, that these ratings would be 
quite different from each other. The conclusion we could 
best derive from these data is that when both ·communicators 
have high expertness, or when expertness is held constant, 
trustworthiness attribute alone can differentially affect the 
subjects 1 opinion change. 
This result seems to differ from that of Hovland and 
Mandell (13) who found a marke'd effect on judgments of fair-
ness of the article, but little effect on amount of opinion 
change, where the suspect source differed from the non-suspect 
one primarily in characteristics of trustworthiness rather 
than of expertness. In the present study, there were both 
significant differences in judgment of fairness, and actual 
opinion change between high- and low- trustworthiness groups. 
Hovland, Janis & Kelley (11) indicated that the small 
effect on opinions may be attributable to a special combi-
nation of factors such that the extents of the speech and the 
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qualification of' the speaker (expertness) were more important 
than his personal motive (trustworthiness). This expl~nation 
does not apply for the present study. A systematic study on 
attributes of communicator-credibility, expertness and trust-
worthiness, is one of the areas of research which needs 
further clarification. 
As to the process of opinion change due to communicator-
credibility, Hovland, Janis & Kelley (11) speculated at what 
point attitudes toward the sources have their effect in the 
process of attending to perceiving, interpreting, learning, 
and believing the content of communication. For the captive 
audience, like subjects in the present study, who could hardly· 
avoid being exposed t.o the communication, two of the above 
possibilities for the different effectiveness of the source-
credibility seem to operate in producing opinion change, namely, 
the learning and acceptance (believing). 
All previous studies indicate that there are slig..l1.t di.i'-
ferences in learning whether the communication is presented 
by high- or low- credible sources. For instance, Hovland and 
Weiss (15) found no significant difference in the number of 
fact-quiz items an'Bvrered correctly immediately after the com-
munication. Similar results are reported bY Hovland and 
Mandell (13) on their study on devaluation of currency. Kelman 
and Hovland (16) also reported that recall scores for items on 
the communication at the delayed after-test, were not signifi-
cantly different ft1r the positive and the negative sources. 
The present study confirmed this generalization. That 
is, there was negligible difference in recall score or learning, 
between high- and low- credible groups (means: 3.49 and 3.44, 
respectively). Therefore, acceptance of the communication, 
rather than learning, seems to be the gl"eater contributing 
factor in opinion ch~nge. 
Hovland, Janis & Kelley (li) also explained why this 
acceptance is likely to be heightened by increasing credi-
bility of the communicator. According to them, the subject 
accepts the communicatfon which he anticipates to lead to 
reward, social approval, and avoidance of punishment. These 
anticipations increase when a communication is presented by 
a person who is credible rather than non-credible. 
How much of the total effect is from the communicator-
credibility alone to affect the subjects 1 opinions still re-
mained undetermined. In otherwords, the effect of the com-
muni·cation alone is difficult to isolate from that of the 
added influence of a stated or assumed source. 
Several cognitive theorists tried to establish a law 
about the person and the message he delivers. For instance, 
Heiderts (7) logical analysis of 11i.mit formation and balanced 
. -
states 11 suggests that audience tend to maintain the same atti-
tude toward the communicator as toward the assertion he makes. 
Thus, if the attitude toward the communicator is different 
from that toward what he communicates, an 11 unbalanced staten 
occurs, and this can be resolved by changing the attitudes 
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toward the communication, toward the communicator, or toward 
the communicator's role. 
Similarly Osgood and Tannenbaum (19) proposed the princi-
ple of' congruity. They said that 11 predi cted changes in attitude 
toward both source and concept are based upon the combined 
operation of' a principle 9f congruity, a principle of suscep-
tibility as a function of polarization, and a principle of 
resistance due to incredulity for incongruence of message. 11 
In this respect, some data are available on the changes 
of subjects' ratings on trustworthiness of the communicator 
from the bef'ore- to after- sessions from the present study. As 
noted before, there was considerable increase in trustworthi-
ness of the low-credible communicator while a slight decrease 
·in trustworthiness was observed for the high-credible communi-
cator. This change might be interpreted as the effect of 
communication. However, as the sources rated at the before-
and after- sessions were not exactly the same, and the regression 
effect is possible, this change could not be attributed solely 
to the communication. 
CommUlkication-Discrepancy 
The generalization that opinion change is a positive 
fQnction of communication-discrepancy is a quite well docu-
mented phenomenon in the sense of its comparative invariability 
Qnder the diverse experimental conditions ~~d measuring devices. 
The results of the present study also confirmed this generali-
zation. 
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A theory of cognitive dissonance proposed by Festinger 
(3) presents a somewhat general conceptualization of these 
phenomena. The central assertion of this theory is that a 
person who holds cognitions about himself or the env~ronment 
that are inconsistent with each other, ex.periences dissonance, 
i.e., psychological tension having drive char~cteristics. Thus, 
when the communication advocated is discrepant from the position 
a person held, the 11 dissonanceu is created and the 11tensionH to 
resolve this dissonance is mobilized to produce opinion change:, 
toward the communication. This theory is not the only one which 
deals with ''cognitive inconsistency" and its relation to opinion 
change. It is similar to Heider 1 s co~~itive balance, to Osgood 
and Tannenbaums 1 principle of congruity, as mentioned before, 
and to Newcomb's 11 strain toward preferred states of equilibri-
um" (18). 
Hovland, however, stated in his recent paper (9) that 
when the commQnication source is perceived as credible, opinion 
change increases with increasing discrepancy; but, that when 
the source is viewed as neutral or ambiguous or negative, then 
increasing discrepancy may lead to decreasing opinion change. 
It appears at first that Hovland made a quite different 
prediction from the predictions of the above cognitive theorists. 
If, however, the conditions which Hovland, Harvey & Sherif (10) 
aealt with are examined, their results are not contradictory 
to other research findings. That is, when the communicator is 
ambiguous or neutral and the communicator 1 s position is divergent 
in an extreme degree, it seems that mechanisms other than 
opinion change, namely, the misinterpretation or dissociation, 
etc., are readily available. Their data on the subjects' 
ratings on fairness of the com:munication, .can explain this 
phenomenon: for example, when a commu_~ication is directed at 
the pro-prohibition, nearly all of the subjects who favored 
prohibition consider it fair and impartial, but only a few per 
cent of the subjects who opposed to prohibition consider the 
identical communication fair. Thus, when the communicator is 
ambiguous, one of the ways of dealing with discrepant positions 
is to discredit the communicator, considering him unfair and 
biased. 
A similar phenomenon is observed in the present study. 
Subjects whose initial opinion position is more discrepant 
from the communicator's position, rated the same article as 
less fair than those whose stand is less discrepant from the 
communicator (means: 5.20 and 6.59, respectively); and the 
difference between these two means is significant (p<. Ol). 
Further support of this phenomenon is evident in that the 
small-discrepancy group also rated the communicator as signifi-
cantly more trustworthy than did the large-discrepancy group 
P~.Ol) when both high- and low- credible groups are combined 
(means: 7.l7 and 6.08, respectively). This, incidentally, con-
firms the data reported by Brehem and Lipsher (l) where they 
fo1md increasing perceived communicator-trustworthiness as com-
munication-discrepancy decreased. 
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These same phenomena are interpreted by the above cogni-
tive theorists in a different way¥ namely, that the psycho-
logical tension created by opinion disagreement is reduced by 
rejection or devaluing of the communication, etc. 
The present result seems to be in accordance with the 
cognitive inconsistency theories mentioned above. On the other 
hand, the present study failed to indicate the resistance to 
change or contrast effect with low-credible communicator and 
largeocommunication-discrepancy, contrary to the Hovland and 
others' expectation. The contrast effect w~s not found in the 
perception of the communicator's position, as negligible cor-
relation between the subjects' initial opinion position and 
their judgments of communicator's position indicated. These 
results, however, could be mainly attributed to the high expert-
ness and also comparatively high trustworthiness of the low-
credible communicator used in this study. From the before-
session data we estimated that low-credible communicator's 
expertness on the topic was not markedly different from that 
of high-credible communicator. And, although the former is 
significantly less trustworthy than the latter, trustworthiness 
of the low-credible communicator in the after-session (mean¥ 
5.10) is slightly above the middle scale point (moderately 
trustworthy). 
Moreover, the communication used for the present study 
was written in a logical form with supporting argument, so that 
it could not be easily demerited. Therefore, Hovland and other-S 
resistance against the communication or 11boomerang effect u; 
ar cognitive theorists 1 dissociation or devaluation of the 
communication, is less likely in the present experimental 
situation. All of the opinion changes with a low-credible com-
municator in the present study showed positive direction, although 
they were not significantly different from the changes in the 
control group. 
Importance of the Topic 
Another important variable influencing the relationship 
between opinion change and discrepancy observed in this study, 
is the importance of the topic. The present results showed 
that the more important the topic, the less the opinion change. 
As the communication advocated that there is no causal 
relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, the 
subjects who feel the topic as more important should change 
more toward the communication than the subjects who feel the 
topic is less important, since this change would release or 
lessen their anxiety. 
In the discussion on the resistance to change for the 
issue of prohibition of alcohol, Hovland, Harvey & Sherif (10) 
explained that the highly involved issue and the established 
attitude which would serve as an anchor stimulus for the 
subjects, might be responsible factors. If the subjects in the 
present study who feel the topic is more important, are assumed 
to form a stronger attitude than the subjects who feel the topic 
as less important before they are exposed to the communication, 
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a comparable explanation to that given above, could be made· 
for the results. The heavy smokers changed their opinions 
iess than the non-smokers and felt the issue as more important 
to them. ·This might be a partial support of the notion of 
established attitude. 
Zimbardo (23), on the other hand, observed an increasing 
opinion change (conformity) as involvement increased with use 
of a highly credible source. He explained this difference be-
tween hi13 ,_ result and that of Hovland~ Harvey & Sherif (10) by 
differentiating 11 issue-involvement, 11 where the issue itself 
is intrinsically involving, and 11 response-involvement, 11 where 
the instrumental meaning qf subj,ect 's opinion is attached to 
the consequence of his response. According to this classi-
fication the involvement of Hovland, Harvey & Sherif, and of 
the present study is the issue-involvement. When Hovland, Janis 
& Kelley's explanation of acceptance of communication by the 
captive audience, presented above, is taken into consideration, 
Zimbardo 's differentiation becomes ambiguous, ·since in both 
cases the subjects change their opinion in order to get rein-
forcement, such as getting approval, avoiding punish~ent, etc. 
The concept of the established attitude again seems to be a 
pertinent one for the explanation of the difference in the above 
studies. That is, in Zimbardo's subjects the communicator was 
highly credible (close friend), but potentially little established 
attitude on the issue of juvenile delinquency which could be 
strong enough to offset the friendship. 
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Hovland, Harvery & Sherif went a step further from the 
above explanation and predicted that under conditions of high 
involvement, increasing discrepancy would lead to decreasing 
attitude change. When the effects of high- and low- importance 
are examined separately for large- and small- discrepancy groups 
in the present study, there was found to be no interaction. In 
other words, both low-importance groups within the two different 
discrepancy groups consistently changed more toward the commu-
nication than. did the high-importance groups. 
No immediate explanation of this difference is possible. 
The degree of importance or of involvement, in the above 
study and the present study might be different, and might be 
responsible for the different result. Without making independent 
and comparable measures of establishment of attitude, importance~ 
discrepancy, etc .. ,no final explanations of the. different results 
are possible. 
! 
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Table 11 
Means of Experimental and Control 
Groups for Six Respects Measuredc 
Mean SD 
Exp. Cont. Exp. 
Initial Position of the Ss. 7-13 7.04 2.58 
Importance of the Topic 6.25 6.43 3.11 
Judgment of the Commu_ni-
cator's Position 3. 24 3.27 2.10 
Trust·vwrthiness of the 
Communicator 6.58 6.13 2.76 
Fairness of the Communi-
cation 5.58 5.81 3.22 
Recall Score or Learning 3.48 3.49 0.85 
Experimental Group N=l49 
Control Group N=67 
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Cont. 
2.60 
3.16 
1.96 
2.65 
2.76 
0.80 
Table 12 
Net Proportion of Change for Each Experi-
mental Sub-Group and the Control Group 
High-Credibility Low-Credibility 
Control Large- Small- Large- Small-
Group Discrep. Discrep. Discrep. Discrep. 
N 67 38 40 42 29 
Positive 
Change 0.40 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.48 
No Change 0.24 0.37 0.27 0.24 0.28 
Negative 
0.24 Change 0.36 0.03 0.15 0.21 
Net Proportion 
of Change 0.04 0.57*~*' 0.43* 0.34** 0.24 
Diff. 0.14 0.10 
Each experimental sub-group net proportion of change 
is compared with the net proportion of change of the control 
group. 
* 
** 
Significant at .05 level. 
Significant at .01 level. 
All p values are tested by CRsj and are one-tailed unless 
other\'lise specified. 
N 
Mean 
SD 
Diff. 
Table 13 
Mean Opinion Change for Each Experimental 
Sub-Group and the Control Group 
Discrepancy measured by difference be-
tween s's initial opinion position and 
S's judgment of communicator•s position 
High-Credibility Low-Credibility 
Control Large- Small- Large- Small-
Group Discrep. Discrep. Discrep. Discrep. 
67 40 38 38 35 
0.28 2.50** 0.71 1.94** -0.17 
2.73 1.10 1.10 2.93 2.24 
1. 79*"'(- 2.11~* 
~~* Significant at .Ol stevel. 
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Source 
Table 14 
Analysis of Variance of Change Scores for 
Experimental Groups with Credibility 
and Discrepancy as the Variables 
Discrepancy measured by difference be-
tween S 1s initial opinion position and 
S 1 s judgment of communicator 1 s position 
s.s. df m. s. F 
19.63 l 19.63 3.58 Credibility ( c ~ Discrepancy (D 141.46 l 141.46 25.77 
Interaction: C x D 0.33 1 0.33 
Within 726.74 145 5.49 
Total 958.16 l48 
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'Ibis is an opml.on survey on current social issues sponsored by the Human 
Rah\tions Center of Bost.on University., 
I o The following statements of opinion concern various social issueso Each 
statement expresses a point of view which may or may not coincide with your own 
views, 
Please indicate ~ou~ agreement or disagreement with each statement by marking 
a cross in that scale category which most closely corresponds to your own feelings 
on the mattero The scale ranges in equal steps from 0 (complete disagreement) 
through 5 (uncertain or in doubt) to 10 (complete agreement)o For example: if you 
agree completelz with a state~ent~ place a cross in scale category 10; if you 
disagree completell, mark scale value 0; the other scale categories are to be used 
for lesser degrees of agreement or disagreemento 
1"' The fear of capital punishment prevents many people from committing murderso 
0 
complete 
disagreement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
uncertain 
or in doubt 
7 8 9 lO 
complete 
agreement 
2o Communism is a more advanced economic system than capitalism just as 
capitalism was an advancement beyond feudalismo 
0 
complete 
disar:reemen t 
1 3 5 
ur.certain 
or in doubt 
7 8 9 10 
complete. 
agreement 
3.. People who smoke cigarettes are more likely to have lung cancer later in life 
than are people who do not smokeo 
0 1 
complete 
d:isagreemen t 
2 3 4 6 
uncertain 
or in doubt 
7 8 9 Io 
complete 
agreement 
4 <> TI-1e danf~er of radioactivity fallout from the testing of nuclear weapons 
is greater than the threat of the increasing nuclear power of Russiao 
0 1 
complete 
disagreement 
2 3 4 5 6 
uncertain 
or in doubt 
7 8 9 10 
complete 
agreement 
(Continue to the next page) 
2 
.,.., Wi Udn }) y£:·ars 9 Hed China. will be a greater threat than Russia to the 
pP.ople of free world,, 
l 
0 
complete 
disagreement 
1 3 4 5 6 7 
uncertain 
or in doubt 
8 9 10 
complete 
agreement 
6o The testing of nuclear weapons should be stopped because of the increasing 
amount of radioactivity fallout which threatens human welfareo 
I. 1 2 4 :s 7 0 3 6 8 9 1o 
complete uncertain complete 
disagreement or in doubt agreement 
7c Cigarette smoking is one of the causes of lung cancer o 
1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1o 
complete uncertain complete 
disagreement or in doubt agreemsnt 
Bo In dealing with juvenile delinquents, psychological counseling should be 
used instead of punishment. 
L_~~~~~~6~~-.7~~g~~9~~1~o~ 
complete uncertain complete 
disagreement or in doubt agreement 
(Continue to the next page) 
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~I<> >.;..,; l;e i.(alld l~.i,:.c, ·,.; .,,_··,·:o_; ... o. 'l'''··· ·-·';Y(·t::,:·. c.::.·7h ci"' ·v,2 fol:Luw.i:"l~T tov:ic:. 
~:.o '}tCt'.v That 5.~j~ hot·! r,:·.:; :-! \l_·t' \'r .:·:::.···1 .. :\;_ ~~~ .. h:,~·,;~ (.·:t:·' .:.n\..:e\~: .. :3\...ed ill each t.Of.i·~~? 
~:.::~.e·~jf;(; :.~··2t-3 u;-1ct·1 o~:1r.. b,l ·:!~~:- __ ·j·: ... ' ... 2~'"'c:c".~s:; ~-:r t:c!~.iL :..,;, __ :.;~~~lc G&l.eg:;-t~y -:./r1ich most.. closel;r 
c········r . r1 ~- ~u ·rcu·· Ot'" '\: .• ,· ,-.-~3. T~H ;,·c;:::1c: 't'J.L:··es f:tO·TI J (:;o·~ i-r.eorta.c;i~ at ~11 
·i,,l' r;i.~)·,·{:,r;·'iuj (~;;t~·:::.:··,·~·;;.j·,:·' ,.-::, ·' v 1eJ" The in':.erv<::runt; r: .. •mbc-.:·.;; ace to be Ll5~:)rl 
fo:t degl'ces of impo~ct"-1\''i:!r:.:. p::l·c ,:: L::::;· t1 1 an l bL't lu3s ti~ 2~1 tJ1e :naxj rnurn of lJ'Jo 
lo Cap:itr1l punisi1:nent Hrd prr-;Vclti.:;n of :turcie:cs., 
~-1-l:j.J._iTL. 3 y·t-Ti.~ 5"_L_6""! .. J. "tc'S ··'· "JT_I ··~L:n J 
not, important :nod era tely extre:nely 
at all to me importar; t to me i:nportan t to me 
2~ Communis·n vs., capitalism as an ecor.o:nic systemo 
4J 5::> 6a 80 J 0 lJ 2J 3J 70 90 lJ) 
not important moderately extremely 
at all to me important to me important to me 
J., ·~:esting of nuclear weapons and radioactivity fallouto 
6o r 0 10 20 30 40 5o 70 80 90 lOJ 
not important aoderately extrc:Tiely 
at all·to me important to me i:nportan t to ''IC 
Lo Gigarette s:noking and lung cancer., 
2o 30 40 $·') I 0 10 60 7') 8J 9o lOJ 
not important moderately extremely 
at all to me imp or tan t to me important to :ne 
5. fhreat of Red Chinao 
0 IO 20 30 4a so 60 70 80 9J 1.}) 1 
not il"lportan t -,oderately extre:nely 
at all to me important to me im~ortant to :ne 
... 
'll.'rea t:nen t of juvenile delinquentso ;) c, 
4::> so 60 8'J I 0 10 2J 30 7'J 9:J 1)0 
not important moderately extrel"lely 
at all to :ne important to me important to me 
(Continue to the next pave) 
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liL. Now we would like you to rate each of the following persons or organ~LZaUons 
in t.erms of their expertness and trustworthiness as a source of infor~na tion on 
each of the following topics~ 
'lhe "expertness" of a source refers to the amount of knowledge the sou rca 
has on a particular topico The "trustworthiness" of a source refers to his being 
a fair and unbiased communicator of the factso For instancev you may believe that 
a certain source knows the available facts but, beca.use of bias or special reasons, 
is not presenting the facts impartially or fairly" Or you may believe that a 
source has little knowledge of the facts, but that if he did know them he would 
present them fairly and impartiallyo 
What you are asked to do, therefore. is to rate each of the following sources: 
first in terms of the amount of knowledge they are likely to have on a top~c; then 
in terms of their trustworthiness or fairness and impartiality in presenting the 
factso 
lo Communism vso capitalism as an economic system. 
ao Nikita Khrushchevo 
(1) On this topic~ likely to know: 
all the most of some of 
facts ; ____ the facts; ____ the facts; 
(2) On this topic, 
0 
not trust~ 
worthy at all 
so 60 
moderately 
trustworthy 
only a 
few facts; 
almost nothJ.q~ 
about the t.o~:ic 
8:5 I I 90 lOJ 
extremely 
trustworthy 
be Arnold Petersen, ~ational Secretary of Socialist Labor fartyo 
(1) On this topic, likely to know: 
all the most of some of 
facts ; _the facts; _the facts; 
(2) On this topic, 
0 IO 30 40 so 60 70 
not trust-
worthy at all 
Co Dwight Eisenhowero 
moderately 
trustworthy 
(l) On this topic, likely to know: 
all the most of some of 
facts ; ____ the facts; ____ the facts; 
( 2) On this topic, 
l 
0 ro 20 30 4o 50 6i5 76 
not trust- moderately 
worthy at all trustworthy 
80 
t Bo 
only a 
few facts; 
almost nothi11g 
about tile topic 
' r 90 100 
extremely 
trustworthy 
only a 
few facts; 
' 96 !()j' 
almost no i,;, H!i~ 
a Lout the torj '.~ 
extre:11ely 
trus twort.lty 
s 
( l j On tJ.Tis toph .' Ek~;ly to ki:tow~ 
all the most. of some or 0nly e.. 
facts ~ the facts~' =~,the fa•~t~i:l few fa"C 'i.s ~ 
~ ! 1 1 'I i ! ' v I r· ~o··- 16 20~-----ro--so ·--..,..w~"'--;:: .. v\ ·-,~o J... 9o_,. ;we) 
,·~--'='~ 
not trust~· moderately extremely 
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aJ:?";·;:~, ~ .. ··,, 
abo~.~ ij .. 
worthy at all trustworthy trustworthy 
eo Mao Tse='l\mg, Chairman of Communist Chinao 
(1) On this topic, likely to know: 
all the most of some of only a almos ·. 
facts ; ____ the facts; ____ the facts; few facts; about 
- --.. 
( 2) On this topic, 
1 r 1 r r 1 ~o .... -...:--.,.l~o~-,2=o~· w·:-r-4=o...:..-=:so_...:.-6r:o~....,,=o~- ·~-.!4'1"01.o~'""'9=o.....:......,.1...,.oo..,.-l 
not trust~ moderately extremely 
worthy at all trustworthy trustworthy 
f ,. Fidel Castros premier of Cuba a 
(1) On this topic, likely to know: 
;~ j ·, 
all the mc:;t of some of 
facts ; the facts; the facts; 
-~ =--
only a 
few facts; 
al11ost · ... )t' l:''· 
about 1,r1e ~-·:··~c ~ · 
(2) On this topic~ 
f t ~o~~1o~~2o~-3~a~~4r-o~~:s~o~~6~o~~7~o~=-~oo~~9~o~~1~oo~· 
not trusto moderately 
worthy at all trustworthy 
2o Cigarette smoking and lung cancer., 
a~ Your parentc 
(1) On this topic9 likely to know: 
extremely 
trustworthy 
all the most of some of only a almost ~···~h.:;::· 
abo\1t. t.n"-: '.·:".·.;. facts ; ____ the factsj ____ the facts; ____ few facts; 
{ ? ) On this topic~ 
l l ' 
-0 16 ~0 30 
not trust-=-
worthy at all 
uo so oo 1o 
mode:ra tely 
trustworthy 
l ' l 80 90 100 
extremely 
t.rustwortby 
{ ''on t; nue t~ +'"' •·· ""'" t .. ·· · · ... • ~. u ... .~~e ....  f.«;:,.:.;
bo American Tobacco Uompanyo 
(1) On this topic, likely to know: 
all the most of 
facts ; the facts; 
- -
(2) On this topic, 
t o I 1o I 2o 
some of only a 
the facts; ____ few facts; 
70 Bo 90 100 
6 63 
almost nothing 
about the topic 
not trust-
worthy at all 
30 4o so 6o 
moderately 
trustworthy 
extremely 
trustworthy 
Co Director of the Tobacco Industry Public Relations Uommitteeo 
(1) On this topic, likely to know: 
all the most of some of only a almost nothing 
facts ; ____ the facts; ____ the factsJ few facts; about the topic 
- -
(2) On this topic, 
l~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~9~0~f I 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 """IOJ 
not trust- moderately extremely 
worthy at all trustworthy trustworthy 
do Head of the National Cancer Instituteo 
(1) On this topic, likely to know: 
all the most of some of only a almost nothing 
about the topic facts ; ____ the facts; the facts; ____ few facts; 
(2) On this topic, 
o Io 
not trust-
worthy at all 
20 JO 1 40 50 60 70 
moderately 
trustworthy 
ao 
I f 90 lO<i 
extremely 
trustworthy 
eo Internal Revenue Service, UoSo Treasury Depto 
(1) On this topic, likely to know: 
all the most of some of only a 
facts ; ____ the facts; the facts; ____ few facts; 
almost nothing 
about the topic 
(2) On this topic, 
Lo ' 1o 2o 3o 
not trust-
worthy at all 
Lo 50 6o 70 80 
moderately 
trustworthy 
' r 90 100 
extremely 
trustworthy 
(Continue to the next page) 
(1) On this "topic, likely to know; 
I 
I 
I 
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fo Public Health Serviceo 
all tile· most of son).e of 
facts ; ____ the facts; th~ facts; 
-, 
only a 
_few facts; 
almost nothing 
about the topic 
-
( 2) On this topic, 
, r 
~~~~~~~3=o~T4=o~~5o~~:rn~~7~o~~a~o~~9~o~~lo~a . l 2::> 0 10 
moderat~ly extremely 
tr~stworthy trustwbrthy 
not trust-
worthy at all 
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'!he following article was delivered as a speech by Dro Wo Co Hueper, head 
of the Environmental Cancer Section of the National Cancer Institute, PUblic Health 
Service a 
A Factual Report on the Relationship 
between Cigarette Smold.ng and Lung Cancer 
Tonight I should like to present to you with an objective and impartiBl. 
eye the facts, as we know them, on the currently controversial medical issue of 
cigarette smoking and lung cancero Most discussions of this topic have generated 
more emotional heat than rational light.a As a consequence 9 people vary widely 
in their opinions on this ma.ttero Some hold the !::_xtrel'!! belief that cigarette 
smoking is unquestionably a cause of lung cancer and that if you smoke cigarett-es 
you will eventually have lung cancero others hold to the extrexoo opposite belief 
that cigarette smoking bears no relationship to whether or not a person will 
have lung cancero \\bat is a sound position? rJhat belief is justified by the 
currently known facts? Well, let us look at the factso 
Serious challen(,'SS to the claim, based solely on statistical data# that 
there is a direct causal relationship bet'Ween cigarette smoking and lune cancer 
are made by many research scientists and madioal sta.tisticianso 
The assertion that t®re is a direct cauaecand=effect relationship between 
cigarette smoking and the great increase in recent years in the incidence of ~ung 
cancer is based on a massive statistical study carried out on the smoking habits 
of 1881 000 men 50 to 70 years oldQ About 60 per cent -were regular smokers., the 
others had not smokede According to their statistics nen whc smoke cigarettes 
are 10 times more likely to die of lung cancer than non-smokers. The statistical 
study concluded that the lung cancer death rate is 11 000 per cent higher in 
smokers than amone non-smokerso In ot.her words, the study claimed that there 
is n spectacular relationship bet-ween smok:tnr: habit and lung eancero 
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Tonight I should like to present to you 'With an objective and impartial 
eye the facts, as -we knol!l them, on the currently controversial medical issue of 
cigarette smoking a.nd lung cancers Most discussions of this topic have generated 
more emotional heat than rational lighte As a consequence, people vary widely 
in their opinions on this matter.. What is a sound position? What belief is 
justified by the currently known facts? Well, let u.s look at the facts. 
Serious challenges to the claim, based solely on statist.ica.l data, that 
there is a direct causal relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer 
are made by IJBny research scientists and medical statisticiana 0 
The assertion that there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship bet-ween 
cigarette smold.ng and the great increase in recent years in the incidence of 
lung caooer is based on a massive statistical study carried out on the smoking 
habits of 18811 000 mn 50 to 70 years oldo About 60 per cent were regular smokers• 
the others had not smoked. According to their statistics men who smoke cigarettes 
are 10 times more likely to die of lung cancer than non ... smokerso The statistical 
rrtudy concluded that the lung 9ancer death rate is 11 000 per cent higher in 
smokers than among non-srnokerso In other words, the study clained that there 
is a spectacular relationship between smoking habit and lung cancero 
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To be scientifically acceptable, any theory on the cause of lung cancer 
must reflect a crl tical, balanced, and competent analysis of all the available 
medical., and experimental evidence o We must know not merely tm percentage of 
cigarette smokers with lung cancer, but corx:erning the types and envirol:'liOOntal 
distributions of and eontacts with all known or sust:ected exogenous agentso It 
is only through such scrutin;r that significant and worthwhile infor.rra.tion may 
be obtained as to the relative role which cigarette smoking has played and is 
playing in the production of lung cancero The following .facts, observstions9 
and experiments form an important and integral rart of such an assessment$ 
First or all, the evidence challenges the conclusion that there is a 
direct causal relationship between smoking and the increase in the incidence 
or lung cancero Statistical or correlational association is not eausationo 
For eXlU!Iple, it turned out that there is ~re incidence of juvenile delinquency 
among poor .families than rich f'am:tlieso That is1 increase of' juvenila delin-
quency is poaitive:cy- correlated or has statistical association with poverty0 
On the other band, there is more incidence of juven:I.le delinquency in urbs.n 
areas where people earn much more money than rural areaso This paradoxical 
evidence suggests that neither poverty nor urbanization alone can be a cause 
of juvenile delinquency. It is obvious that there must be many other factors 
responsible for juvenile delinquency other than poverty or urbanization. There. 
may be a more basic factor such as lack of affection or guidance on the part of 
parent which can come from both poverty and urbanizationo Poor families neg1ect 
their children because they are busy in earning tooir livingsp while in t~ 
more industrialized city areaa both parents are emplo-yed~ which resltlts in 
deprivation of affection or guidance from their childreno Thusi poverty may 
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be .~n important fact.cr of juvenile delinquency, and 1.li'baniza:t.ion. may b£ 
a.11other impox-tant factor of juvenile delinquency 9 but there still may ·.:>~ 
"deprivation of affection or guidance" which is an important fact.()r of ~Jot.h,. 
and t..rlthout t-Ihich neither poverty nor urbantzation would operate to prr_.·'!uc~ 
juvard.le dE:•linquencyo 
Lilcew3 se there a:r.e n.UJ,;.erous contradictir;g evidences against t~ nc :ir]!l 
it :ts stu•pr:i.sine to no·~s 1~hc c;,bsenee of positive st.atistical .assC!ci.aticns ':;f:·o 
ttre<m lung cancer and ciga.rette conght> although this later symptora is c L:v~.~zd"' 
ly ~ha.rl~cteristic of chronic chain smokerso Despite the fact that the 1ir•'iJ 
and mouth sre constantly bathed in too tarry liquor oozing from t.he tip .:;f t~u 
cigarettes, am despite the contact of these ~rt.a with the smoke coming froi'l 
the cigarettes~ there is no consistent statistical association -...'it.h cam:er ~,; 
tha~'3e partso Too assertion that no tarry material exudes from too ciga;·et ~.e 
tip is contradicted by the evident fact that chronic cigarette smokers :moe 
observed to have bro't-m""stained fingerso But no sinele record :i..; avfl.ila:.:.le 
of cancer of the finr,ers at.tributable i;o cigarette taro Such cancel's ol' t.:::El 
fingers would be equivalent ·to the nwrerous cases of coal tar cancers of' t' :e 
r.a.nds .fer which records ax-a availableo 
other studies turned up the a.ppwren:f.; part:~.doxical fact tr.tat inhalin,:; v:as 
les:::• con.mon among cancer patients tha..n s.rllong non=ca.ncer pat3.ents" Am~rr: .:o~; 
lung cancer patients only 2 personfl (less than 2 p3r cent) were report..~.- ;.,~· 
J'le:ft':l repcn:ted to h'"'-ve inhaling bahl toe, 
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There must be many other factors other than cigarette smoking worklnr; on in 
producing lung cancero To name some, increased volumes of automobile ex:h.aust 
.runes and industrial vapors polluting the air are to a great part responsible 
£or the causation of lung cancero 
To prove or disprove that there is a causal relationship between cigarett.-:: 
smoking and lung cancer 1 one must have more reliable evidence from the controlled 
experimentso Although the evidence linking cigarette smoking w.i. th lung t~anc~r 
is inconclusive s as it is apparently impossible to carry out properly controll~d 
experiments with human beings, the following experiments offer enouph conf:!.den~~ 
to reject the uzn.arrented assertion that there is a direct causal associatio~1 
bet-ween cigarette smoking and lung cancero 
The following results come from six years of laboratory experirents -..i.th 
the coope:ration of medical,. chemical., and biological scientists, exclusively 
centered around th.e problem of cigarette smoking and lung cancero 
First of all, there is no specific chemical substance in tobacco 9molre 
that can account even for the limited reports of skin cancer in son~:! labo;rot.~r:·· 
animal so 
There are experimental reports on 103 mice whose inner ears l-lere paint-ed 
with tobacco tar extracted .from condensed cigarette smokeo The strength ot' 
tobac(;O tar applied was equivalent to that extracted from 20 c:i.garettes wi'>J.c!-: 
ls coneei ved. of as very strone even with a single applica.tiono This am,)Wl~~ 
was cont:tnued .for 10 months l-rith one application a da.ro None of thetn dP.v~~t'.>f;;;:::d 
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Similarlyil the condensed substances found in tobacco smokes when paint~d 
on susceptible animals in the quantity and exposure rates simulating cond.itioru-<~ 
of heavy smoking by human,, have not induced skin cancer in these animals" 
Most convincing results, above all1 is the actual inhalation of massi·ve-
doses of cigarette smoke by laboratory rabbi tao The amount and the frequency 
of the doses of cigarette smoke were varied from weak to stronr: and 3 to 10 
tines a day, respectively<) These animals underwent these experinental tr<.!aU.:.tents 
for six yearso The reports are available for different experiroontal condi t.:i. or&s 
with different lengths of time of exposureo After six years, not a singk an:~ .• n,aJ 
developed lung ca.neero 
In other words9 all experiments with ani.mal have .failed to provid€· any 
clear-cut result that cigarette smokinG is a cause or lung cancer at least. :;.n 
animal levelso From the past experience in medical research it has been prov~;~ 
that there is biological equivalence between human and sub-ohuman I'll8.l!lr..als~ "~Jl.-::l1 
includes rabbits and mi~among otherso Most of the medical experiments <Jre 
dom on the laboratory animals from the apparent impossibility of using hwoo.!> 
' being as the subject& From these results on animal experiments, medictJ.l 
scientists extend their geooralization to human being, and this has prov-en to 
be valid and reliable for most of the ineidenceo 
If' the premise that the experimental results on laboratory animals can 
be generalized to human being was true; and there is not a single evidence 
that can prove cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer on t~se animal£; 
then the conclusion that there is no evidence to prove cigarette smoklnr: i~ 
a cai.tae of l\lllf. cancer 'ln human beincr would followo Tte above re.:.som.nc _,_ ·o· 
based on the log:ical.syllogism in that if the premise is t.rue.9 UK·n th•.~ r.; ... r." 
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l''rom these considerations., it is apparent that any .fin~.l deciaion con~f:'!r:~·"' 
ing the role of cigarette smoking in the causation of the human lung cancer 
should be kept in abeyance until. a great deal of additional and valld-9 and e~"" 
peciall.y exper:inentally conclusive evidence becomes availableo The clit.<t '"''· 
hand make it unlilrely that cigarette smold.ng represents a major cauoo in th.~ 
production of lung cancer and in its recent increaseo 
~ . 
It is not conclusive to say that the cigarette smoking is not a cs.us:: ot 
lung cancer, simply because there are no experi.m:mtal results availcl>le en 
human beingo It is 9 however, much more injudicious to establish a causal re• 
lationship between ciearette smold.ng and lung cancer based on these a.rnhif:'llc-us 
statistical evidence0 Today"' more than ever before, scientific Avl:ient:>:l ·.:..;2 
accumulat.ing that conflicts w.t th or fails to support the tobacco S)"t;nkinr 
theoi?-es of lung cancero Sheer comparison of the evidences from t;o+,~l s:tr.:t.,:.~ 
indicates that there are significantly more sound exper...rnental z.'!i,~illt::> .... h·~ •;, 
can l'eject the notion that the cigarette smoking is a cause ('f lung ca.nce~ 
than accepting ito 
... ~ ~ . 
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The following article was delivered as a speech by Mro J., P., Richards, 
director of the Tobacco Industry Public Relations Committee which includes 
American Tobacco Company.ll Ro J., Reynolds$ Liggett & Meyers~ Brown Williamsono 
A Factual Report on the Relationship 
between Cigarette Smoking and Lung Cancer 
Tonight I should like to present to you 'With an objective and impartial 
eye the facts 9 as we know them, on the currently controversial medical issue of 
cigarette smoking and lung cancero Most discussions of this topic have generated 
more emotional heat than rational lighto As a consequence8 people vary widely 
in their opinions on this mattero Some hold the extreme belief that cigarette 
smoking is unquestionably a cause of lung cancer and that if you smoke cigarettes 
you will eventually have lung cancer., Others hold to the extreme opposite belie£ 
that cigarette smoking bears no relationshi£ to whether or not a person will 
have lung cancero What is a sound position? What belief is justified by the 
currently known facts? Well, let us look at the factso 
Serious challenges to the claim~ based solely on statistical data, that 
there is a direct causal relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer 
are made by many research scientists and medical statisticians., 
The assertion that there is a direct causeaand=effect relationship between 
cigarette smoking and the great increase in recent years in the incidence of lung 
cancer is based on a massive statistical study carried out on the smoking habits 
of 188,000 men 50 to 70 years oldo About 60 per cent were regular smokers9 the 
others had not smokedo According to their statistics men who smoke cigarettes 
are 10 times more likely to die of lung cancer than non=smokerso The statistical 
study concluded that the lung cancer death rate is laOOO per cent higher in 
smokers than among non=smokerso In other words; the study claimed that there 
is a spectacular relationship between smoking habit and lung cancero 
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The following article was delivered as a speech by Mro J., P. Richards, 
director of the Tobacco Industry Public .Relations Committee which includes 
American Tobacco Company-, R. J ~ Reynolds, Ligr,ett & Meyers, Brown Williamsono 
A Factual Report on the Relationship 
between Cigarette Smoking and Lung Cancer 
Tonight I should like to present to you with an objective and impartial 
eye the facts, as -we know them• on the currently controversial medical issue of 
cigarette smoking and lung cancero Most discussions of this topic have generated 
more emotional heat than rational lighte As a consequence., people vary widely 
in tmir opinions on this :mattero "What is a sound position? What belief is 
justified by the currently known facts? \\'ell, let us look at the factso 
Serious challenges to the claim, baaed solely on statistical data, that 
there is a direct causal relationship bet"Ween cigarette smoking and lung cancer 
are made by rna.tJy research scientists and nedical statisticianso 
The assertion that there is a direct cause..a.n.d-effect relationship between 
cigarette smoking and the great increase in recent years in the incidence of 
lung cancer is based on a ma.ssi ve statistical study carried out on the smoking 
habits of 1881 000 roon 5o to 70 years oldo About 60 per cent ~re regular smokers, 
the others had not smokedo According to their statistics men who smoke cigarettes 
are 10 tines more likely to die of lung cancer than non-smokerse The statistical 
study concluded that the lung cancer death rate is 1 1 000 per cent higher in 
smokers than among non-smokersa In other words1 the study claimed tmt there 
is a s~ctacular relationship between smoking habit and lung cancero 
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To be scientifically acceptable, any theory on the cause of lung cancer 
must reflect a critical~ balanced.9 and competent analysis of all the available 
medical~ and experimental evidenceo We must know not merely the percentage of 
cigarette smokers with lung cancer9 but concerning the types and environmental 
distributions of and contacte with all know.n or suspected exogenous agents¢ lt 
is only through such scrutiny that significant and worthwhile information may 
be obtained as to the relative role which cigarette smoking has played and is 
playing in the production of lung cancero The following facts 9 observations» 
and experiments form an important and integral part of such an assessmento 
First of a119 the evidence challenges the conclusion that there is a 
direct causal relationship between smoking and the increase in the incidence 
of lung cancero Statistical or correlational association is not causationo 
For example9 it turned out that there is more incidence of juvenile delinquency 
among poor families than rich familieso That is8 increase of juvenile delin= 
quency is positively correlated or has statistical association with poverty0 
On the other hand» there is more incidence of juvenile delinquency in urban 
areas where people earn much more money than rural areaso This paradoxical evidence 
suggests that neither poverty nor urbanization alone can be a cause of juvenile 
delinquencya lt is obvious that there must be many other factors responsible 
for juvenile delinquency other than poverty or urbanizationo T.here may be a 
more basic factor such as lack of affection or guidance on the part of parent 
which can come from both po~ and urbanizationo Poor families neglect their 
children because they are busy in earning their livings9 while in the more 
industri•lized city areas both parents are employed~ which results in deprivation 
of affection or guidance from their childreno 1hus 9 poverty ~ay 
82 
l. 
Delivered by Mro Jo Po Richards, director of the Tobacco Industry Public 
Relations Committee which includes American Tobacco Company8 Ro Jo Reynolds, 
Liggett & Meyers, Brown Williamsono 
be an important factor of juvenile delinquency» and urbanization may be 
another important factor of juvenile delinquency9 but there still may be 
"deprivation of affection or guidance" which is an i1nportant factor of both, 
and without which neither poverty nor urbanization would operate to produce 
juvenile delinquencyo 
Likewise there are numerous contradicting evidences against the notion 
that there is a link between cigarette smoking and lung eancero For instance.fl 
it is surprising to note the absence of positive statistical associations be-
tween lung cancer and cigarette cough.9 although this later symptom is clinical~ 
ly characteristic of chronic chain smokerso Despite the fact that the the lips 
and mouth are constantly bathed in the tarry liquor oozing from the tip of the 
cigarettes, and despite the contact of these par_ts with the smoke coming from 
the cigarettes9 there is no consistent statistical association with cancer of 
these partso The assertion that no tarry material exudes from the cigarette 
tip is contradicted by the evident fact that chronic cigarette smokers are 
observed to have brown-stained fingerso But no single record is available 
of cancer of the fingers attributable to cigarette taro Such cancers of the 
fingers would be equivalent to the numerous cases of coal tar cancers of the 
hands f~ which records are availableo 
Other studies turned up the apparent paradoxical fact that inhaling was 
less common among cancer patients than among non-cancer patientso Among 10$ 
lun~ cancer patients only 2 persons (less than 2 per cent) were reported to 
inhale while about 30 per cent of the smokers who did not develop lung cancer 
were reported to have inhaling habitso 
- ~ -
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Without going further to numerate such statistical findings, it is 
apparent that cigarette smoking alone cannot be the cause of lung cancero 
There must be many other factors other than cigarette smoking working on in 
producing lung cancero To name some 11 increased volumes of automobile exhaust 
fumes and industrial vapors polluting the air are to a great part responsible 
for the causation of lung cancero 
To prove or disprove that there is a causal relationship between cigarette 
smoking and lung cancer8 one must have more reliable evidence from the controlled 
experimentso Although the evidence linking cigarette smoking with lung cancer 
is inconclusive9 as it is apparently impossible to carry out properly controlled 
experiments with human beings, the following experiments offer enough confidence 
to reject the unwarranted assertion that there is a direct causal association 
between cigarette smking and lung cancero 
The following results come from six years of laboratory experiments with 
the cooperation of medical9 chemical, and biological scientists9 exclusively 
centered around the problem of cigarette smoking and lung cancero 
First of all, there is no specific chemical substance in tobacco smoke 
that can account even for the limited reports of skin cancer in some laboratory 
animalso 
There are experimental reports on 103 mice whose inner ears were pain ted 
with tobacco tar extracted from condensed cigarette smokeo The strength of 
tobacco tar applied was equivalent to that extracted from 20 cigarettes which 
is conceived of as very strong even with a single applicationo This amount 
was continued for 10 months with one application a dayo None of them developed 
cancer in their inner earso 
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Similarly, the condensed substances found in tobacco smoke, when painted 
on susceptible animals in the quantity and exposure rates simulating conditione 
of heavy smoking by humans}) have not induced skin cancer in these animals o 
Most convincing results, above all, is the actual inhalation of massive 
doses of cigarette smoke by lab ora tory rabbi tao The amount and the frequency 
of the doses of cigarette smoke were varied from weak to strong and 3 to 10 
times a day8 respectivelyo These animals underwent these experimental treataents 
for six yearso The reports are available for different experimental conditions 
with different lengths of time of exposureo After six years, not a single animal 
developed lung cancero 
In other words 9 all experiments with animal have fail €3d to provide any. 
clear-cut result that cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer at least in 
animal levelso From the past experience in medical research it has been proven 
that there is biological equivalence between human and sub-human mammals» which 
include.s rabbits and mice among otherso Most of the medical experiments are 
done on the laboratory animals from the apparent imporssibility of using human 
being as the subjecto From these results on animal experiments, medical 
scienti~ts extend their generalization to human being~ and this has proven to 
be valid and reliable for most of the incidenceo 
If the premise that the experimental results on laboratory animals can 
be generalized to human being was true; and there is not a single evidence 
that can prove cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer on ~. ~; 
then the conclusion that there is no evidence to prove cigarette smoking is 
a cause of lung cancer on human being would followo The above reasoning is 
based .on the logical syllogism in that if the premise is trueJI then the 
85 
Delivered by Mro Jo Po Richards, director of the Tobacco lndustry Public 
Relations Co~~ittee which includes American Tobacco Company, Ro Jo aeynolds~ 
Liegett & Meyers, Brown Williamsono 
From these considerations, it is app~ent that any final decision concern-
ing the role of cigarette smoking in the causation of the human lung cancer 
should be kept in abeyance until a great deal of additional and valid , and 
especially experimentally conclusive evidence becomes availableo The data on 
hand make it unlikely that cigarette smoking represents a major cause in the 
production of lung cancer and in its recent increaseo 
It is not conclusive to say that the cigarette smoking is not a cause of 
lung oancer9 simply because there are no experimental results available on 
human beingo It is8 however, much more injudicious to establish a causal re-
lationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer based on these ambiguous 
statistical evidenceo Today9 more than ever before9 scientific evidence is 
accumulating that conflicts with or fails to support the tobacco smoking 
theories of lung cancero Sheer comparison of the evidences from both sides 
indicates that there are significantly more sound experimental results that 
can reject the notion that the cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer 
than accepting ito 
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Io Now, we would like to obtain your evaluation of the article and of the 
communicator a 
lo First» estimate the position of the author of the article you have just 
read on the scales belowo 
Scale ranges in equal steps from 0 through 5 to lOo 0 represents the 
com lete re ection of the statement; ~ represents uncertain or in doubt& and 
_2 represents the complete acceptance of the statemento 
You will indicate the position of the author of the above article by 
circling the number which you think best represents his positiono For examples 
if you think the author of the article rejects the statement completely, circle 
0; and if you think he accepts it completely circle lOo You may circle any 
number along the scale from 0 to lOo · 
a a Cigarette smoking is one of the causes of lung cancero 
0 1 2· 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
complete uncertain complete 
rejection or in doubt acceptance 
bo Cigarette smoking is statistically associated with occurrence of 
lung cancer o 
0 
complete 
rejection 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
uncertain 
or in doubt 
7 8 9 ro 
complete 
acceptance 
2 n How do you rate the author of the article in -terms of his trustworthiness? 
Please indicate the degree of trustworthiness of the author by circling ~ 
number along the scale belowo 
3o 
of 
0 f 2 3 4 $ 6 
not trust- moderately 
worthy at all trustworthy 
Do you think the article is fair or one-sided? 
fairness by circling the number 
0 
completely 
one-sided 
1 2 3 
along the scale 
4 5 6 
moderately 
fair 
- 7 = 
7 8 
Please 
below a 
7 8 
9 10 
extremely 
trustworthy 
indicate the degree 
10 
completely 
fair 
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IIo Now, we would like to obtain some information concerning your own beliefs 
about cigarette smoking and lung cancero 
lo Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements 
by circling the number which best represents your own feelings along the scale 
belowo 
Scale ranges in equal steps from 0 (complete disagreement) through 5 (un= 
certa:in or in doubt) to 10 (complete agreement) with the statemento For example, 
if you disagree with the statement completely circle Oi and if you agree with 
it completely circle 10o You may circl any number along scale from 0 to lOo 
ao 
bo 
Cigarette smoking is one of 
0 1 2 3 
complete 
disagreement 
People who smoke cigarettes 
in life than 
0 
complete 
disagreement 
are 
1 
people who 
2 3 
the causes of lung 
L 5 6 7 
uncertain 
or in doubt 
are more likely to 
do not smokeo 
4 s 6 
uncertain 
or in doubt 
7 
cancer-.. 
8 9 
have lung 
8 
10 
complete 
agreement 
cancer later 
10 
complete 
agreement 
2o Please indicate how important is this topic of cigarette smoking and lung 
~cer to you along the scale belowo 
0 
not important 
at all to me 
1 2 3 4 s 6 
moderately 
important to me 
7 8 9 lJ 
extremely 
important to me 
/ 
IIIo Now we would like to determine how well you recall some of the points 
made in the articleo Following items are the multiple choice questions about 
the article you have reado Please select one alternative among four alterna-
tives which you think is correct or the besto 
Please do not return to the article even you do not recall some of the 
factso We are interested in getting your first response without going back to the 
articleo 
lo Statistical association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer indicates 
one of the following: 
lo one~to=one relationshipo 
-----2. causal relationship. 
3o no causal relationshipo 
--4o no relationship at all 
2o The assertion that there is cigarette=cancer link is conclusive only when: 
lo there is enough statistical evidenceo 
----~2o there is enough experimental results on laboratory animalso 
3o combination of 1 and 2o 
---iL o there is enough experimental evidence on human beings o 
3o The inhaling habit was more common among: 
lo non=eancer patientsa 
--2 o cancer patients o 
3. constant smokerso 
4o chain smokerso 
4o Laboratory rabbits who are exposed to inhalation of cigarette smoke: 
lo all of them developed lung cancero 
-----2 0 about 10% of them developed lung cancero 
3o less than 2~ of them developed lung cancero 
-----4o none of them developed lung cancero 
So Generalization on human being from the animal experiments: 
lo is falseo 
-----2o is logically falseo 
-----3o is valid when the premise is trueo 
4. is valid when the premise is falseo 
---
- 9 ~ 
IVo We would like to have some information concerning your smoking habito 
lo Do you smoke? 
YES 
------
What do you smoke? 
cigarette _____ ; 
pipe ; 
cigar_ o 
How many cigarettes (or 
packs) .do you smoke 
a day? 
less than 5 cigarettes 
--6 to 10 .11 
11 to 15 11 
--16 to 20 11 
21 to 30 n 
--31 to 40 II 
_---:more than 2 packs 
Smoked before but stopped _____ ; 
smokE.? What did you 
cigare't.tes __ ; 
pipe-----
cigar ____ o 
How. l'JffJ:/11 cigarettes ( o:, 
packs) did you smoke 
a day? 
less 
--6 
11 
----.16 
21 
--31 
more 
-
than 5 cigarette;·.~ 
to 10 11 
to 15 " 
to 20 11 
to 30 II 
to 40 " 
than 2 packs 
.. 10 -
NO 
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It would be appreciated if you cou1d provide the following informationo 
Your Name ______________ _ 
Major ------
Year: ________________ __ 
Are you interested in getting the results of the study later? 
Yes:_ 
Comment if any: 
t-lo: 
Note: 1his page will be destroyed after your name is replaced by a code Noo 
9l 
Lf 
92 
References 
1. Bre~~, J. ·W., &' Lipsher, C. Communicator-communicatee 
discrepancy and perceived communicator trustworthiness. 
J. Pers., 1959, gr, 352-361. 
2. Ewing, T. H. 
of opinion. 
A study of certain fcwtors involved in changes 
J. Soc. Psvchol ., 1942, 16, 63-88. 
3. Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. New York: 
Row, Peterson, 1957. 
4. ~ine, B. J. Conclusion-drawing, communicator credibility-, 
and anxiety as factors in opinion change. J. abnor.m. soc. 
Psychol., 1957, 2±, 369-374. 
5. Fisher, S., & Lubin, A. Distance as a determinant of 
influence in a two-person serial interaction situation. 
J. abnor.m. soc. Psychol., 1958, 56, 230-238. 
6. Goldberg, B. C. Three situational determinants of con-
formity to social norms. J. abb.orm. soc. Psvchol., 1954, 
~' 325-329. 
7. Heider, F. Attitudes and cognitive organization. J. Psychol., 
1946, 21, 107-112. 
8. Helson, H. Adaptation-level as a basis for a quantitative 
theory of frame of reference. Psychol. Rev~, i948, 55, 
297-313. 
9. Hovland, C. I. Reconciling conflicting results derived 
from experimental and survey studies of attitude change. 
Amer. Psychologist, 1959, 14. 8-17. 
10. Hovl~nd, C. I., Harvey, 0. J., & Sherif, M. Assimilat-
ion and contrast effects in reaction to communication and 
attitude change. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1957, 55, 244-252. 
11. Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L, & Kelley, H. H. Communication 
and persuasion. New Haven: Yale Univer. Press, 1953. 
12. Hovland, C. I., Lumsdaine, A. A., & Sheffield, F. D. Ex-
periments on mass communication. Princeton: Princeton-,--
Univer. Press, 1949. 
13. Hovland, C. I., and Mandell, W. An experimental comparison 
of conclusion-drawing by the communicator and the audience. 
J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1952, ~' 581-588. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19 •. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
93 
Hovland, C. I., and Pritzker, H. A. Extent of opinion 
change as a function of amount of change advocated. J. 
abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1957, 54, 257-261. --
Hovland, C. I., and V'leiss, W. The influence of source 
credibility on communication effectiveness. Publ. Opin. 
Quart., 1951, 15, 635-650. 
Kelman, H. C. and Hovland, C. I. 11Reinstatement 11 of the 
communicator in delayed measurement of opinion change. 
J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1953, 48, 327-335. 
McGarvey, H. R. Anchoring effects in the absolute judg-
ment of verbal materials. Arch. Psychol., N.Y., 1943, 
2.2,, No. 281. 
Newcomb, T. M. An approach to the study of communicative 
acts. Psychol~· Rev., 1953, 60, 393-404-. 
Osggod, C. E., and Tannenbanm, P. The principle of con-
gruity and the prediction of attitude change. Psychol. 
Rev., 1955, 62, 42-55. 
Sims,. V. M. Factors influencing attitude toward TVA. 
J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1938, 2}, 34-56. 
Sherif, M. , Taub, D., & Hovland, C. I. Assimilation and 
contrast effects of anchoring stimuli on judgments. J. 
exp. Psychol., 1958, ~, 150-155. 
Weiss, W. The relationship between judgments of a com-
municator's position and extent of opinion change. J. 
abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1958, 56, 38-384. 
Zimbardo, P. G. Involvement and communication discrepancy 
as determinants of opinion conformity. J. abnorm. soc. 
Psychol., 1960, 60, 86-94. 
Abstract 
Although previous researches have directed considerable 
attention toward the effect on opinion change of isolated varia-
bles such as communicator-credibility and communication-discrepan-
cy, among others, little attempt has been made to incorporate 
these variables into a single experimental design in order to 
assess their separate as well as combined effects. The purpose 
of the present study is to vary experimentally the degree of com-
municator-credibility and commu..n.ica.tion-discrenancy, thereby in-
vestigating the main and interaction effects of these two varia-
bles on opinion change. 
Reviewing the existing research evidences leads to the fol-
lowing hypotheses: 
Greater extent of opinion change toward the communication 
is expected when: communicator is high-credible than low-credible; 
an~ communication-discrepancy is large than small. When the com-
municator is high-credible, greater extent of opinion cp~nge is 
expected for large-discrepancy than small-discrepancy group. No 
hypothesis is advanced on the effect of communication when the 
communicator-credibility is low. 
In order to test the above hypotheses, a before-after design 
was used. Among 216 college students, 149 subjects, V'Tho served 
as the experimental group~ were exposed to the communication 
which advocated the idea that there is no causal relationship be-
tween cigarette smoking and lung cancer. One half of the experi-
mental subjects read the communication in which the source is 
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attributed to a high-credible communicator and the other half 
read it from a low-credible communlc~tor. Also, for one half of 
each group, a few additional anchor statements, that some people 
hold to the opinion-extremes on the issue, were insel'!ted at the 
beginning of the communication in the expectation that these 
anchor statements would affect the subjects to judge the commu-
nication as less extreme than they would without t~ese statements. 
The other half read the communication without these anchor state-
ments. The former is, therefore, called the small-discrepancy, 
and the latter the large-discrepancy groups. 
Opinion positions on the issue discussed in the commnnication 
were measured before and after the communication. In addition 
to these, a series of judgmental items was included in order to 
obtain measures on the experimental v~riables, and other rele-
vant information. 
The control group (N=67) gave their opinions before reading 
the communication, and then made the same judgments of the com-
munication as did the experimental subjects. 
The checks on the experimental manipulations of the above 
two variables indicate that only the high vs. low communicator-
credibility was successfully differentiated. Due to the failure 
of the manipulation of the discrepancy variable by anchor state-
ments, the commUL~ication-discrepancy of the present study was 
derived from the subject's judgments on the communicator 1 s position. 
The subjects were divided into two groups using the m~dian 
of the communicator's position judged by the subjects as the 
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cutting point. The above-median group is called the small-dis-
crepancy group, and the beloir-median the large-discrepancy group, 
since the below-median group as a whole is more discrepant than 
the above-median group with reference to their overall initial 
opinion position. The control subjects were also separated on. 
this communication-discrepancy. 
The opinion change is assessed by the change score from 
before to after communication. The experimental group showed 
significantly greater extent of opinion change toward the commu-
nication than the control group showed. The results also con-
firmed the hypotheses advanced. Thus: 
(1) The group who received the communication which was 
attributed to the high-credible source significantly changed 
more toward the communication than did the group which read 
the communication from the low-credible source. 
(2) The subjects who judged the communicator's position 
as more discrepant from their own stand changed significantly 
more toward the communication than did those who judged it 
less discrepant. 
(3) The interaction effect between these two main varia-
bles, communicator-credibility and communication-discrepancy, 
was not significant. That is, within high- and low- credible 
gi!:'oups~·bbth large-discrepancy groups changed more toward the 
communication than did the small-discrepancy groups. 
The effects on opinion change of other related variables--
such as the importance of the topic, smoking habits, fairness 
of the article, and learning-- were examined. 
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